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In recent years, several Australian states have formally committed to treaty negotiations with 
the First Peoples whose traditional lands they claim. The emerging treaty processes in Australia 
build on both the comprehensive land claim agreements currently under negotiation in Can-
ada as well as the historic treaties struck between First Peoples and colonial powers in North 
America and Aotearoa / New Zealand. Parties engaged in these negotiations appropriately 
view treaties as mechanisms through which First Peoples and non-Indigenous political commu-
nities can settle ongoing tensions surrounding political autonomy, citizenship, and pluralism. 
However, it is not clear whether these processes can produce such outcomes. In this article, 
we contend that, although fairer processes of negotiation may avoid some of the problems of 
historic treaties, modern treaty making in Canada, Australia, and elsewhere will fail to meet 
the parties’ aspirations unless greater attention is paid to building relational characteristics. 
We do so by outlining the promises and perils in modern treaty making with an eye toward 
understanding the limits of the law.
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I Introduction
Since 1973, Canada has sought to negotiate and settle First Peoples’ rights through 
comprehensive land claims.1 These modern treaty processes are conceived as a 
mechanism to recognize and reconcile ‘pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty … 
with assumed Crown sovereignty.’2 In recent years, several Australian states and 
territories have joined Canada in formally committing to treaty making with the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander nations whose traditional lands lie within 
their borders.3 In both states, modern treaty making seeks to rectify injustices and 
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1 We use the term ‘First Peoples’ as a general term to refer to Māori, First Nations, Inuit, Me-
tis, Aboriginal, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and Indians or tribes, but we 
do use more localized terms where appropriate. We do not use the term ‘Indigenous peo-
ples’ unless speaking of all of those peoples with regard to international law. See Stephen 
Young, Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 
2019) at 9–10.
2 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 20, [2004] 3 SCR 
511 [Haida Nation]; Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, Renewing the 
Comprehensive Land Claims Policy: Towards a Framework for Addressing Section 35 Aboriginal Rights 
(Interim Policy, September 2014) at 7.
3 Harry Hobbs & George Williams, ‘Treaty-Making in the Australian Federation’ (2019) 43:1 
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respond to generations of First Peoples’ advocacy. In both cases, modern treaty 
making reveals the limits of the law.
First Peoples’ demands for renewed treaty-making processes are, in part, a 
product of the contemporary legal context in which Indigenous peoples and 
communities live. Colonial massacres, dispossession, and marginalization have 
alienated many First Peoples from their traditional governance systems while 
disempowering them from structures of settler state political power. If effective, 
modern treaty making offers the potential to rebuild and re-empower First Peo-
ples, enabling them to play a meaningful role in the development and imple-
mentation of solutions to problems faced by their communities. Institutional 
and structural reform to the state is therefore an integral element of treaty, but 
modern treaties can have broader significance. In encouraging and stimulating 
conversations, treaties can provide a common language for citizens within and 
across diverse political communities to engage and learn from each other.4 In 
doing so, they may help build a culture of respect that takes seriously the interests 
and aspirations of First Peoples. 
These are lofty ambitions. It is not clear whether they can always be realized. 
The lengthy history of treaty making between First Peoples and colonial powers 
in North America and Aotearoa / New Zealand suggests that, even if there are 
‘glimmers of hope’ in contemporary practices,5 modern treaty making should 
be approached with a degree of caution. As First Peoples have long argued, 
historical treaties failed to generate or produce the outcomes desired by the 
Indigenous signatories.6 Treaties were often negotiated on an inequitable basis, 
and states largely, though not entirely, avoided and downplayed the commit-
ments that they made. How can modern treaty making avoid these challenges? 
Is modern treaty making simply ‘an advanced form of control, manipulation, 
and assimilation’?7
4 Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, Community and the Canadian Constitu-
tion (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994) at 192–3; Harry Hobbs, 
‘Constitutional Recognition and Reform: Developing an Inclusive Australian Citizenship 
through Treaty’ (2018) 53:2 Australian Journal of Political Science 176.
5 Jacinta Ruru, ‘A Treaty in Another Context: Creating Reimagined Treaty Relationships in 
Aotearoa New Zealand’ in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reima-
gining the Implementation of Historic Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017) 306 
at 332 [Ruru, ‘Treaty in Another Context’].
6 The modern treaty process emerged in Canada in 1973. We define historic treaties as those 
negotiated prior to this date. In North America, this includes early treaties negotiated by the 
Dutch, the Peace and Friendship Treaties negotiated in the early eighteenth century by the 
British and French, treaty making following the American Revolution in both the United 
States and Canada, and the Numbered Treaties, which concluded with Treaty 11 in 1921. 
It also includes the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi in Aotearoa / New Zealand. We recognize that 
this covers a vast period, which was often marked by very different attitudes and approaches 
to treaty making, but have adopted this definition in order to distinguish between the con-
temporary period where the state is more concerned with adopting fairer negotiation pro-
cedures than previously.
7 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 
119–20.
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It is generally assumed that designing fairer processes of negotiations can ad-
dress and rectify the problems that marred historic treaties. In this article, we 
challenge that assumption. We argue that if modern treaty making is to realize 
its promise, it must confront a broader challenge. Treaties between First Peoples 
and settler states are both legal and relational instruments, but because modern 
treaty making occurs within the framework of the state, the relational dimension 
can be overlooked. Without greater focus on rebuilding (or building) genuine 
relationships between First Peoples and settler states – both inside and outside 
treaty negotiation processes – the outcome of any negotiation may be to simply 
encourage First Peoples to ‘fit into’ the cultural normative ordering of the dom-
inant society rather than to promote and protect their distinct normative orders 
and ways of living.8 
Our argument proceeds in four parts. We begin in Part II, by outlining the 
dual legal and relational character of treaties between First Peoples and settler 
states. As we explain, treaties are legal texts to the extent that the parties accept 
a series of enforceable obligations and responsibilities that are intended to bind 
them to the agreement that they made. At the same time, treaties are relational 
documents, for they are not envisaged ‘as a finite contract but as the foundation 
for a developing social contract.’9 A treaty will only be effective and meaningful 
if it is able to realize both legal and relational goals. Where one party is unable 
to secure recourse for the other’s routine failure to uphold its obligations, that 
party may question whether a ‘shared understanding of and commitment to a 
normative framework for cross-cultural relationships’ has truly emerged.10 Simi-
larly, if that agreement fails to build trust and mutual respect between the parties 
and, instead, is treated in sparing terms as a particular type of legal contract, the 
deeper value of the document is limited.11 
Modern treaty making is informed by its historic antecedents. For this reason, 
it is valuable to explore how the participants in historic treaty practices sought to 
meet the relational and legal dimensions of treaty. In Part III, we explore a snap-
shot of historic treaty making in North America and Aotearoa / New Zealand. 
Our review of the negotiation and implementation of historic treaties suggests 
two major challenges for contemporary treaty making. In some cases, inequitable 
negotiating processes meant that the agreement was never built on a firm base 
of trust and mutual respect. Without that base, many treaties failed to engender 
right relations. In other cases, while the parties may have initially committed to 
8 Michael Coyle, ‘Establishing Indigenous Governance: The Challenge of Confronting Main-
stream Cultural Norms’ in Ghislain Otis & Martin Papilllon, eds, Fédéralisme et Gouvernance 
Autochtone: Federalism and Aboriginal Governance (Quebec City: Presse de Université Laval, 
2013) 141 at 142 [Coyle, ‘Establishing Indigenous Governance’].
9 Waitangi Tribunal, Motunui Waitara Report (Wai 6, 1983) at 52 [Waitangi Tribunal, Motunui 
Waitara Report].
10 Mark Walters, ‘Brightening the Covenant Chain: Aboriginal Treaty Meanings in Law and 
History after Marshall’ (2001) 24:2 Dal LJ 75 at 78 [Walters, ‘Brightening the Covenant 
Chain’].
11 Simon v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at 404; Brian Slattery, ‘Making Sense of Aboriginal and 
Treaty Rights’ (2000) 79 Can Bar Rev 196.
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a just relationship, state building shifted the broader power dynamics between 
the parties. As a result of this shift, the colonial power qua state no longer felt 
relationally bound by their obligations. States disregarded their obligations in 
different ways in different places at different times. In Aotearoa / New Zealand, 
the treaty itself was declared to be of no legal effect.12 In Canada, promises made 
in the 1763 Royal Proclamation were dismissed.13 In the United States, treaties 
remained law, but the state assumed the power to abrogate their terms at its pleas-
ure.14 Notwithstanding this diversity in practice, common to all three cases is the 
fact that these nation-to-nation agreements were domesticated within the state’s 
legal system.
The process of domestication allowed the state to remove ‘the Indigenous 
question’ ‘from the sphere of international law’ and place it within its own exclu-
sive competence.15 In doing so, colonial powers could then seek to strip First Peo-
ples of most of their attributes of sovereignty, including the control of land, the 
operation of their governing structures, as well as their status under international 
law.16 Significantly, however, this process had a particular effect on treaty making. 
By pivoting from its role as treaty partner and assuming the position of treaty 
adjudicator, the state displaced the fundamental relational character of treaty.17 
As treaty adjudicator, the state was able to prioritize its own understanding of the 
instrument and downplay or ignore its obligations. The breakdown in the rela-
tional character of treaty thus inexorably affected its legal dimension. 
In Part IV, we examine modern treaty practices in Canada, Australia, and Ao-
tearoa / New Zealand and assess how they respond to the two challenges we 
identified. As we demonstrate, modern processes are cognizant of the relational 
character of treaty; states have worked to address key problems arising from 
treaty negotiation processes. However, because treaties between First Peoples and 
the state remain domesticated, modern processes have not been able to tackle 
the second challenge. Modern treaties may be appropriately characterized as 
‘nation-to-nation’ agreements, but they secure their legal force through enact-
ment of state legislation.18 Consequently, the terms of that agreement are ulti-
mately defined and adjudicated by and under state law. Even if fair and equitable 
negotiation processes are established – and many First Peoples contend that this 
is not the case – the outcome of those negotiations empowers states with the legal 
12 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) 72 (SC) [Wi Parata].
13 St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber v R, [1888] UKPC 70, 14 App Cas 46 [St Catherine’s Milling].
14 Lone Wolf v Hitchcock, (1903) 187 US 553 [Lone Wolf].
15 Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapporteur, Studies on Treaties, Agreements and Other Construc-
tive Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20 
(22 June 1999) at 24, para 192.
16 Ibid at 18, para 110.
17 John Borrows, ‘Origin Stories and the Law: Treaty Metaphysics in Canada and New Zea-
land’ in Mark Hickford & Carwyn Jones, eds, Indigenous Peoples and the State: International 
Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018) 30 [Borrows, ‘Origin 
Stories’].
18 See e.g. Nisga’a Final Agreement, 4 May 1999 (entered into force 11 May 2000); Nisga’a Final 
Agreement Act, SBC 1999, c 2; Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, SC 2000, c 7.
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authority to pivot from treaty partner to treaty adjudicator. Where this risk per-
sists, relational and legal fractures may emerge. 
Treaties purport to establish a shared framework that will ‘guide the parties’ 
relationship for the indefinite future, if not forever.’19 When given effect in state 
law, however, states can monopolize and unilaterally interpret what that frame-
work means, potentially weakening the basis of that relationship. How then can 
First Peoples be sure that a treaty will protect their interests? How then can the re-
lational character of treaty endure?20 Recognizing that our answer is both provi-
sional and partial, we argue in Part V that efforts to build positive and productive 
relationships both inside and outside treaty processes are part of the solution.21 
Promoting right relations between First Peoples and the state may help frame 
how intercommunal disputes are resolved and how an agreement is interpreted, 
potentially ameliorating some of the challenges that state law continues to pres-
ent. While it may not be possible (within state law) to legally preclude the state 
from acting in ways that unilaterally further state interests, acts of relationality 
may help foster an ethic that infuses the treaty process with moral and political 
pressure to work together. That ethic may enable non-Indigenous peoples to rec-
ognize First Peoples as valuable contributors and partners in governing. State ac-
tion will remain an ever-present risk, but non-legal acts of relationality may help 
to recentre focus on the enduring promise of treaty – the opportunity to cultivate 
and create perpetual ‘peace, friendship, and respect.’22
II The dual character of treaties
Treaties between First Peoples and states are complex, multidimensional instru-
ments. While both parties enter negotiations in the desire to secure legal certainty 
over a range of claims and interests, these agreements are more than simply legal 
covenants. They are also declarations of enduring relations that seek to connect 
‘different peoples through constitutional bonds of multicultural unity.’23 Treaties 
therefore have a dual character; they are both legal and relational instruments. 
These twin characters are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Although 
19 Michael Coyle, ‘As Long as the Sun Shines: Recognising That Treaties Were Intended to 
Last’ in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implemen-
tation of Historic Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017) 39 at 40. But see Jeremy 
Waldron, ‘The Half Life of Treaties: Waitangi, Rebus Sic Stantibus’ (2006) 11:2 Otago L Rev 
161.
20 Carwyn Jones, ‘Māori and State Visions of Law and Peace’ in Mark Hickford & Carwyn 
Jones, eds, Indigenous Peoples and the State: International Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018) 13 [Jones, ‘Māori and State Visions’].
21 Please note that while we acknowledge that there is merit in exploring whether and how bi-
partite neutral treaty implementation forums empowered to implement Indigenous values 
and to hear evidence in Indigenous languages could promote effective treaties, our focus in 
this article is on relationships rather than institutions.
22 John Borrows, Law’s Indigenous Ethics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019) at 38.
23 Robert Williams Jr, Linking Arms Together: American Indian Visions of Law and Peace (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997) at 105 [Williams, Linking Arms Together].
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the terms of any modern treaty obtain their legal force through the enactment 
of domestic legislation, the moral and political power of the instrument arises 
from the process of negotiation and the strength of the relationship that it pro-
duces. Where that process is inequitable or that relationship uneven, the author-
ity of the treaty itself is weakened. Significantly, then, an effective and meaningful 
treaty requires a relationship built on mutual trust and respect. 
A treaty creates binding and enforceable obligations, but it is not an ordinary 
legal instrument. Unlike contracts, partnership agreements or service delivery 
arrangements, for instance, treaties speak in a different register. Consider the 
Noongar Treaty in Australia as an example.24 On 30 March 2015, the Noongar 
people of southwest Western Australia voted to accept a settlement agreement 
negotiated with the Western Australia government. The settlement is signifi-
cant. Involving about thirty thousand Noongar people and covering around two 
hundred thousand square kilometres, it is the largest and most comprehensive 
agreement concerning Aboriginal interests in land in Australian history.25 Its 
value is approximately 1.3 billion Australian dollars, and it ‘includes agreement 
on rights, obligations and opportunities relating to land, resources, governance, 
finance, and cultural heritage.’26 In exchange for this package, the Noongar peo-
ple agreed to surrender all current and future claims relating to historical and 
contemporary dispossession.27 
Agreements like the Noongar Treaty have legal consequences, but, 
self-evidently, they are more than simply legal texts. As political agreements 
reached via a process of respectful negotiation that ‘articulate basic terms and 
conditions of social co-existence,’28 treaties are also relational instruments. This 
character is present across and beyond the agreement. As part of the settlement, 
the Western Australian Parliament enacted legislation drafted in Noongar lan-
guage for the first time in history.29 The Noongar (Koorah, Nitja, Boordahwan) 
24 South West Native Title Settlement, 8 June 2015 (not yet entered into force). Noongar (Koorah, 
Nitja, Boordahwan) (Past, Present, Future) Recognition Act 2016 (WA); Land Administration (South 
West Native Title Settlement) Act 2016 (WA).
25 Gian De Poloni, ‘WA Premier Signs $1.3 Billion Noongar Native Title Settlement,’ ABC News 
(8 June 2015), online: <http://perma.cc/B3SJ-KULX>.
26 Harry Hobbs & George Williams, ‘The Noongar Settlement: Australia’s First Treaty’ (2018) 
40 Sydney L Rev 1 at 31.
27 Note that the settlement has not yet entered into effect. Although the settlement 
was approved by the Noongar people and enacted in state legislation, several Noon-
gar people have challenged the settlement in Australian courts. The settlement will 
only commence if those applications are dismissed. Calla Wahlquist, ‘“It Is Not About 
Money”: Australia’s Largest Native Title Settlement Challenged Again,’ The Guardian 
(30 November 2018), online: <www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/nov/30/
it-is-not-about-money-australias-largest-native-title-settlement-challenged-again>.
28 Patrick Macklem, ‘The Constitutional Identity of Indigenous Peoples in Canada: Status 
Groups or Federal Actors?’ in Jean Cohen, Andrew Arato & Astrid von Busekist, eds, Forms 
of Pluralism and Democratic Constitutionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018) 117 
at 124 [Macklem, ‘Constitutional Identity’].
29 Western Australia, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates (22 March 2016) at 1496 (Peter 
Collier, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs).
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(Past, Present, Future) Recognition Act 2016 (Western Australia) recognizes the 
Noongar people as the traditional owners and occupiers of southwest Western 
Australia, and their continued relationship with country.30 On the day that the 
bill was introduced into the Parliament, Noongar elder Elizabeth Hayden, told 
reporters: ‘My heart is weeping with joy. We live with hope because we’ve been 
knocked from pillar to post for generations. We’ve always lived in hope that we 
would get to a point of being acknowledged as the first people of this nation. … 
The past is past, but we need to move forward to a better future.’31
Members of Parliament also recognized the need to acknowledge past wrongs in 
order to construct a more just future. In his speech during the bill’s second reading, 
the minister for Aboriginal affairs, Peter Collier, spoke of the deep injustices that 
had been done to the Noongar people since the arrival of the British in 1826. He 
recounted the ‘one-sided struggle over land and resources,’ the ‘devastating spread 
of introduced diseases,’ the hardening of attitudes toward Aboriginal people at the 
turn of the twentieth century, and the ‘repressive and coercive system of control’ 
mandated by the Aborigines Act 1905 (Western Australia), the impact of which 
‘still resonates throughout Western Australian society.’ And, yet, despite this ‘his-
tory of oppression and marginalisation,’ the ‘Noongar people have survived’ and 
continue ‘to assert their rights and identity.’32 Deputy Opposition Leader Roger 
Cook spoke in a similar language, explaining that the settlement represented ‘a 
coming together between two nations to agree upon certain things and, in doing 
so, finding a way forward together and recognizing each other’s sovereignty.’33 
These statements are important for they signal the deeper resonance of First 
Peoples-State treaty making. Although the terms struck are significant for both 
parties, the value of the agreement extends beyond the text. As Robert Williams 
Jr has argued, a treaty is ‘a way of imagining a world of human solidarity where we 
regard others as our relatives,’34 and it encompasses the ‘idea of being able to live 
together in harmony.’35 It is through sitting around a table and talking that rela-
tionships built on trust and communication across and between distinct political 
communities can be developed. It is through those relationships that participants 
are able to envisage and share in the design of a shared future, where political 
power is consensually distributed.36 
30 Noongar (Koorah, Nitja, Boordahwan) (Past, Present, Future) Recognition Act 2016 (WA), s 5.
31 Australian Associated Press, ‘WA Introduces Bill Recognising Noongar People as 
Traditional Land Owners,’ Guardian Australia (14 October 2015), online: <www.
theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/oct/14/wa-introduces-bill-recognising-noongar- 
people-as-traditional-land-owners>.
32 Western Australia, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates (22 March 2016) at 1496–7 (Pe-
ter Collier, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs).
33 Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (19 November 2015) at 8688 
(Roger Cook, Deputy Opposition Leader).
34 Williams, Linking Arms Together, supra note 23 at 94.
35 Wemba-Wemba and Noongar woman Carissa Lee. Cited in Victoria, ‘Deadly Questions: 
What Does a Treaty Mean to You?’ online: Government of Victoria <https://deadlyques-
tions.vic.gov.au/deadly-question/what-does-a-treaty-mean-to-you> [‘Deadly Questions’].
36 Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Po-
litical Liberty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) at 270. That parties strive for 
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The relational character of First Peoples-State treaties recurs in the contem-
porary discussion on treaty making in both Canada and Australia. It is reflected 
in the preamble to the Nisga’a Final Agreement, which notes that a treaty is a 
symbol of ‘equal partnership,’ based on ‘mutual recognition and sharing.’37 It is 
also present in the preamble to the Victorian Act that creates a legislative basis for 
negotiating a treaty with Aboriginal people in the state: 
Through this historic Act, all Aboriginal Victorians and the State are building on this and 
other good work and embarking on a renewed and mature relationship. This relationship 
is one of equal partnership, founded on mutual respect and a commitment to justice and 
equality for Aboriginal Victorians, and to promoting reconciliation between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal Victorians.38
The same language has been adopted in the preliminary phases of treaty making 
in the Northern Territory. In the Barunga Agreement, the Northern Territory 
chief minister and the four Aboriginal Land Councils agreed to develop and 
implement a consultation process leading to treaty negotiations. The agreement 
envisages treaty as a substantive means for empowering Aboriginal communities 
with real decision-making authority. At the same time, it upholds treaty as offer-
ing the potential to ground ‘lasting reconciliation between the First Nations of 
the Territory and other citizens with the object of achieving a united Northern 
Territory.’39 As this language suggests, through its dual character, treaty making is 
the process by which non-Indigenous political communities obtain the moral and 
legal right to ‘share the land’40 and by which ‘unresolved issues of reconciliation 
can be resolved.’41 For this reason, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized 
that a treaty is more than a legal contract; ‘a treaty represents an exchange of 
solemn promises … [and] an agreement whose nature is sacred.’42
consensus about how to distribute political power does not mean consensus or fair distri-
bution is achieved. As a political project, agreement making will be ‘agonistic,’ meaning 
that there will be continual disappointments and ongoing conflicts. See Chantal Mouffe, 
On the Political (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2005). As applied to treaties within a public law 
context, see Mark Hickford, ‘The Historical, Political Constitution: Some Reflections on Po-
litical Constitutionalism in New Zealand’s History and Its Possible Normative Value’ (2013) 
4 NZLR 585 at 594–5.
37 Nisga’a Final Agreement, supra note 18, preamble. See further Patrick Macklem, ‘Indigenous 
Peoples and the Ethos of Legal Pluralism in Canada’ in Patrick Macklem & Douglas Sander-
son, eds, From Recognition to Reconciliation: Essays on the Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal 
and Treaty Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016) 17 at 21–3 [Macklem, ‘Indig-
enous Peoples’].
38 Advancing the Treaty Process with Aboriginal Victorians Act 2018 (Vic).
39 Barunga Agreement (Aboriginal Land Councils–Northern Territory Government), 8 June 
2018 (memorandum of understanding) at 6.
40 Michel Asch, On Being Here to Stay (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 97.
41 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge – Final Report of 
the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation to the Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Parliament 
(Canberra: Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 2000) at 10.
42 R v Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 at para 41, La Forest, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, and 
Iacobucci JJ majority [Badger].
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Contemporary relational understandings of treaty making draw inspiration 
from historic treaties negotiated between First Peoples and colonial powers in 
North America and Aotearoa / New Zealand. The force of those agreements was 
not simply in the final settlement of their terms but, rather, in the process of their 
negotiation and continuing renewal; they were intended as dynamic and respon-
sive sites of negotiation and recorded and revitalized through ritualized perfor-
mances that drew the parties together into an ‘ongoing personal relationship.’43 
While a treaty may have been finalized at a council fire, it was never final. Rather, 
it was considered the starting point for ‘ongoing discussion and reassessment.’44 
In North America, for instance, in the years following agreement, both parties 
would travel and meet to polish the Covenant Chain,45 to exchange wampum 
belts, and to ‘maintain the conditions of peaceful relations.’46 In these actions, 
the parties purported to bind themselves into an enduring relationship. 
First Peoples often expressed the treaty relationship in ‘ecological terms’ to un-
derscore its permanence.47 During negotiations, First Peoples’ chiefs repeatedly 
emphasized that the agreements struck would ‘last as long as the sun shines and 
the river runs’48 or ‘as long as the moon brightens the night, as long as water runs 
and the grass grows in spring.’49 Colonial negotiators echoed this imagery. Alexan-
der Morris, the primary Canadian negotiator for several of the numbered treaties, 
expressed settler conceptions of these agreements in similar terms. On 19 August 
1876 near Fort Carlton, Morris explained to Cree and Salteaux chiefs: ‘I told you 
also that what I was promising was not for to-day or to-morrow only, but should 
continue as long as the sun shone and the river flowed.’50 Treaty is the means 
through which two or more parties agree to act in a certain way with the goal of 
building an enduring partnership. But what sort of partnership is envisaged? 
43 Jones, ‘Māori and State Visions,’ supra note 20 at 26.
44 Waitangi Tribunal, He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti – The Declaration and the Treaty: The Report 
on Stage 1 of the Te Paparahi o Te Raki Inquiry (Wai 1040, 2014) at 460 [Waitangi Tribunal, He 
Whakaputanga].
45 G Peter Jemison, ‘Sovereignty and Treaty Rights: We Remember’ (1995) 7:3 St Thomas L 
Rev 631.
46 Bruce Morito, An Ethic of Mutual Respect (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) at 68 [Morito, Ethic of 
Mutual Respect]. See further Susan Hill, The Clay We Are Made Of: Haudenosaunee Land Tenure 
on the Grand River (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2017) at 98.
47 James Sákéj Youngblood Henderson, ‘Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties’ (1997) 36:1 Alta L 
Rev 46 at 51. Sharon Venne argues that this terminology is more appropriately understood 
in biological and genealogical terms. Cf Sharon Venne, ‘Understanding Treaty 6: An Indig-
enous Perspective’ in Michael Asch, ed, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, 
Equality, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 173 at 194.
48 Cree Chief Mis-tah-wah-sis in negotiations that led to Treaty 6. Reproduced in Alexander 
Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories, includ-
ing the Negotiations on Which They Were Based, and Other Information Relating Thereto (Toronto: 
Belfords, Clarke and Company, 1880) at 213 [Morris, Treaties of Canada].
49 Blackfoot Chief Zoatze-Tapitapiw in negotiations that led to Treaty 7, reproduced in Morris, 
The Treaties of Canada, supra note 48 at 271.
50 Ibid at 208. This formulation was repeated at several different negotiations. See also negoti-
ations that led to Treaty 1 (at 29).
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Reflecting differences in worldviews, First Peoples and colonial powers may 
have had diverse opinions. The Two Row Wampum Treaty, signed in 1613 by the 
representatives of the Five Nations of the Haudenosaunee and representatives 
of the Dutch government in what is now upstate New York, is often upheld as an 
example of the ideal equitable relationship built by and through treaty making. 
Even here, however, Haudenosaunee tradition, which records their reply to the 
Dutch treaty proposal, reveals challenges: 
You say that you are our Father and I am your Son. We Say, We will not be like Father and 
Son, but like Brothers. … Neither of us will make compulsory laws or interfere in the inter-
nal affairs of the other. Neither of us will try to steer the other’s vessel.51
Recognizing that treaty is a precursor to ‘a just relationship,’52 and a way to en-
gender right relations, emphasizes that one party’s failing to substantively meet 
the commitments they have made will risk that relationship. Equally, those com-
mitments must themselves be substantive or else the relationship will be cheap-
ened. In earlier times, this required commitments to avoid trying to steer the 
other’s vessel. Today, developing an enduring partnership not only requires a 
suite of forward-looking mechanisms that empower First Peoples to build con-
temporary institutions of self-government, but it also requires acknowledgement 
and apology for ‘political commitment to a more just future can only be secured 
by acknowledgement of past wrongs and the promise of reparative action.’53 
Modern treaties thus promise to be ‘relationship-building instruments as well 
as rights-defining instruments.’54 As legal texts, treaties empower First Peoples by 
recognizing or establishing institutions of self-government. At the same time, in 
serving as a forum for engagement and in striving to formally distribute political 
power between and among political communities, treaties seek to renew relation-
ships and create a bridge for diverse peoples to converse. For this reason, this 
legal instrument should not be understood as merely reflecting a ‘standard con-
tractual commercial interaction’ but, rather, an articulation of a deeper culture 
of respect and relationship.55 
Historical and contemporary treaties aim to develop these dual characters, 
but contemporary treaty negotiations take place in a very different context from 
their historic forms. Power asymmetries mean that modern treaty practices oc-
cur within a framework that presupposes state law as the default. For instance, 
51 Cited in Williams, Linking Arms Together, supra note 23 at 83.
52 Taiaiake Alfred, Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2005) at 156.
53 Harry Hobbs, ‘Locating the Logic of Transitional Justice: Native Title in Australia’ (2016) 
39:2 UNSWLJ 512 at 513 [Hobbs, ‘Locating the Logic’].
54 Julie Jai, ‘Bargains Made in Bad Times: How Principles from Modern Treaties Can Reinvig-
orate Historic Treaties’ in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reima-
gining the Implementation of Historic Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017) 105 
at 139.
55 Matthew Palmer, ‘Constitutional Realism about Constitutional Protection: Indigenous 
Rights under a Judicialized and a Politicized Constitution’ (2007) 29 Dal LJ 1 at 29 [Palmer, 
‘Constitutional Realism’].
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though many Noongar people voted in favour of their treaty, the scope of the 
potential agreement was always limited by the state. The Noongar lead negotia-
tors recognized these limits and adopted a pragmatic approach; their aim was ‘to 
secure recognition and cultural and customary rights over our traditional lands, 
and consequently, to lay a platform of self-determination.’56 Whether that plat-
form proves sufficiently sturdy largely depends on the quality of the relation-
ship that the treaty helps establish. As we trace in the following Part, a review of 
historic treaty making demonstrates that where negotiations are inequitable or 
unfair, or where one party monopolizes the interpretation of the agreement, the 
relationship can sour and its promises can be lost.
III Historic treaties and inequities
The practice of historic treaty making between First Peoples and colonial pow-
ers in North America and Aotearoa / New Zealand informs and motivates mod-
ern treaty processes. As many First Peoples have noted, however, historic treaties 
often failed over time to maintain the relational element necessary to ground 
sustainable and meaningful settlements. In this Part, we outline two common, 
interrelated problematic areas of treaty practice that emerged in these sites in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although not a comprehensive review of 
centuries of treaty making, nor a full account of the factors that led to inequities, 
our snapshot highlights two key relational failings. We demonstrate how inequita-
ble treaty negotiation inhibited the formation of just relations and how unilateral 
treaty interpretation challenged the maintenance of peace and mutual respect. 
In Part IV, we turn to how modern practices are responding to the limitations of 
their historical antecedents.
A NEGOTIATION
Three broad challenges that arose at the negotiation stage inhibited the ability 
of many historic treaties to promote and develop enduring relationships. First, 
negotiations did not always culminate in a clear set of expectations and under-
standings on both sides. Second, negotiation did not always occur, with some 
treaties essentially proposed on a take it or leave it basis or even drafted before 
an agreement was actually reached.57 Third, and perhaps most commonly, ne-
gotiations were not always conducted in good faith, as colonists often sought to 
coerce, intimidate, or manipulate their counterparts. In each case, some form of 
inequity at the earliest stage of treaty making meant that the agreement struck 
was never infused with the necessary trust and mutual respect. In the absence 
of that grounding, right relations were difficult to maintain. Of course, treaties 
between First Peoples and settler states, like all relationships, can be messy and 
complicated. The quality of the relationship that is created by and through the 
56 Glen Kelly & Stuart Bradfield, ‘Negotiating a Noongar Native Title Settlement’ in Sean 
Brennan et al, eds, Native Title from Mabo to Akiba: A Vehicle for Change and Empowerment? (An-
nandale, Austl: Federation Press, 2015) 249 at 250.
57 Walters, ‘Brightening the Covenant Chain,’ supra note 10 at 78.
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negotiated instrument can flourish or founder, depending on the commitment 
of each party. This commitment too can wax and wane over time. Fair settlements 
can be broken, and bad bargains struck in difficult times can be reimagined, if 
the relationship is strong enough. 
The process of negotiation has differed across many historic treaties. In sev-
eral cases, what we would today describe as a ‘treaty’ largely comprised of only 
oral discussion and debate. Although the agreement was understood to bind the 
parties, it may not even have been recorded because all sides recognized that its 
power and authority lasted only as long as their relationship endured.58 This was 
the case for the Covenant Chain, an alliance between Aboriginal and European 
parties in North East America during the seventeenth century.59 Initially, the 
agreement emerged as an economic arrangement, but, over time, it expanded 
to address military and political issues. As Bruce Morito explains, its effectiveness 
depended on both parties’ willingness to redress concerns and renew relation-
ships, while its evolution revealed the development of an ‘intercultural sensibil-
ity’ and ‘shared culture.’60 Agreement was often embodied in physical objects, 
like wampum belts, but the parties’ respective legal rights and obligations were 
never precisely outlined.61 The absence of a clear text did not detract from, or 
diminish, the authority of the agreement, however, because its strength was its 
relationship. Reflecting that character, the settlement was never final, but it had 
to be renewed. It was through annual meetings that the parties could ‘strengthen 
and brighten the chain of friendship.’62 
When parties are committed to renewing relationships and there are relational 
practices in place, eschewing clear legal obligations is not necessarily problem-
atic. However, as power dynamics shifted for various reasons, state actors could 
rely on the absence of clear legal obligations to downplay the commitments that 
they had made. For this reason, while modern treaties must retain the key rela-
tional character of their antecedents, they must also outline a series of mutual 
58 Aaron Mills / Waabishki Ma’iingan, ‘What Is a Treaty? On Contract and Mutual Aid’ in 
John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of 
Historic Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017) 208: ‘A treaty is the relationship 
itself.’
59 Morito, Ethic of Mutual Respect, supra note 46 at 24–30. John J Borrows & Leonard I Rotman, 
Aboriginal Legal Issues: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 4th ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2012) 
at 16–17 [Borrows & Rotman, Aboriginal Legal Issues] (also identifying the 1664 Articles be-
tween Colonell Goerge Cartwright and the NewYork Indians as the first indication of the 
Covenant Chain).
60 Morito, Ethic of Mutual Respect, supra note 46 at 30.
61 Of course, the general agreement was clear. Consider the Two-Row Wampum, which un-
dergirds a relationship of peace, friendship, and respect between Haudenosaunee and co-
lonial powers. For a discussion, see Robert Williams Jr, The American Indian in Western Legal 
Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 327, citing 
House of Commons, Special Committee on Indian Self-Government, Indian Self-Government 
in Canada: Report of the Special Committee (1983) (chair: Keith Penner).
62 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Journal of the Proceedings of the Congress 
Held at Albany, in 1754 (John H Eastburn, 1836) at 30; Walters, ‘Brightening the Covenant 
Chain,’ supra note 10 at 82.
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rights and responsibilities. Modern treaties are relational instruments, but they 
are also ‘highly technical blueprints for future systems of rule,’ ensuring that the 
parties can be clear about the terms of their agreement.63 Without this clarity and 
enforceability, it may be difficult for parties to trust one another. 
In other cases, actual negotiations between parties may not have taken place. 
For instance, it is difficult to say that the Treaty of Waitangi is a negotiated in-
strument as it is not clear that the Māori had any influence over the drafting of 
its terms. William Hobson, the lieutenant governor of New South Wales and the 
British consul to New Zealand, prepared the document with the assistance of 
James Busby, the British resident in New Zealand, and translated it into Te Reo 
Māori on 4 February 1840. This was the document that forty-three Māori chiefs 
assented to on 6 February.64 Hobson and others then travelled throughout the 
North Island to secure a further 450 signatures from hapū (clan) chiefs.65 While 
the Māori discussed whether they should accept it or not, and Hobson and his 
colleagues relied on their understanding of tikanga Māori (the Māori way of do-
ing things) to draft the instruments, its terms were not negotiated. Many chiefs 
did accept it,66 and Hobson, as governor, would later proclaim that it applied to 
all Māori. The absence of any negotiation, however, undoubtedly contributed to 
inconsistencies between the English and Te Reo Māori texts. In fact, several ex-
perts have argued that because of these differences Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the 
Treaty of Waitangi are ‘best regarded as “two very different documents.”’67 
Finally, in many cases, historic treaties failed to lead to positive settlements 
because the negotiations were not conducted in good faith or were even out-
right fraudulent. Countless examples exist. Consider the 1737 Walking Treaty. 
In 1736, brothers John and Thomas Penn claimed that, under a 1686 deed (its 
validity itself in question), the Lenape Nation had promised to sell a tract of land 
running from a certain point to as far west as a man could walk in a day and a 
half.68 After some negotiations, the Lenape agreed to honour the deed, assuming 
63 Ravi de Costa, ‘History, Democracy, and Treaty Negotiations in British Columbia’ in Alex-
andra Harmon, ed, The Power of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008) 297 at 313; Sari Graben & Matthew Meaffey, 
‘Negotiating Self-Government over and over and over Again: Interpreting Contemporary 
Treaties’ in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Imple-
mentation of Historic Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017) 164 at 165 [Graben 
& Meaffey, ‘Negotiating Self-Government’].
64 Robert Miller et al, Discovering Indigenous Lands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 
212 [Miller et al, Discovering Indigenous Lands]; Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi (Wel-
lington: Bridget Williams Books, 2010) at 24–47 [Orange, Treaty of Waitangi].
65 Orange, Treaty of Waitangi, supra note 64 at 60–91.
66 Notably, many also did not. See e.g. Rawina Higgins, ‘“Ko te mana tuatoru, ko te mana 
Motuhake”’ in Mark Hickford & Carwyn Jones, eds, Indigenous Peoples and the State: Interna-
tional Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018) 129.
67 See discussion in Tiopira McDowell, ‘Diverting the Sword of Damocles: Why Did the Crown 
Choose to Settle Māori Historical Treaty Claims’ (2018) 64:4 Australian Journal of Politics 
and History 592 at 592, n 1 [McDowell, ‘Diverting the Sword of Damocles’].
68 Francis Jennings, ‘The Scandalous Indian Policy of William Penn’s Sons: Deeds and Docu-
ments of the Walking Purchase’ (1970) 37 Pennsylvania History 19 at 29.
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that a walk through the dense forests at a conventional pace would cover around 
twenty miles. However, as Stuart Banner explains, the chief justice of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court surveyed and cleared a route through the forest and 
hired the three fastest runners in the colony.69 Accompanied by horses carrying 
provisions, the men travelled 55 miles, leading to cession of around twelve hun-
dred square miles of Lenape land.70 Despite protestations that the amount was 
far greater than intended, the ‘treaty’ stood. Its consequences still stand today: in 
2004, the US District Court belatedly acknowledged that Lenape title had been 
extinguished by fraud but nonetheless dismissed their case.71 This decision was 
affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, holding that Aborigi-
nal title can be validly extinguished by fraud.72
Negotiations were not any more equitable following independence. In 1778, 
the United States entered into its first treaty, reaching an agreement with the 
Delaware Nation, led by White Eyes, at Fort Pitt. A wampum belt was exchanged, 
committing the parties to perpetual peace and friendship and legally recognizing 
territorial rights for both polities.73 However, the Delaware complained about the 
final version of the treaty. We cite from Colin Calloway at length: 
The Delawares complained that the American commissioners ‘put a War Belt & Toma-
hawk in the hands of said Delaware Nation & induced some of their Chiefs to sign cer-
tain Writings’ that contained ‘declarations & Engagements they never intended to make.’ 
They returned the belt and tomahawk. The speaker for the Delaware Council said he had 
‘looked over the Articles of the treaty again & find that they are wrote down false, & as I did 
not understand the Interpreter what he spoke I could not contradict his interpretation, 
but now I will speak the truth plain & tell you what I spoke.’ George Morgan [a trader 
and later congressman], who was not present at the treaty, said the Delawares had ‘a very 
wicked false Interpreter,’ and he denounced the treaty as ‘villainously conducted.’ … The 
peace and friendship pledged at Fort Pitt did not last long. White Eyes died in November, 
murdered by American militia. William Crawford … who had attended the treaty, died 
four years later, ritually tortured to death by Delaware warriors exacting vengeance for the 
slaughter of their relatives.74
As a political agreement struck by distinct normative communities with widely 
divergent motivations and expectations, disputes were always going to arise over 
the meaning of the bargain reached between the Delaware and the United States. 
Significantly, however, inequities during the negotiation stage precluded the 
settlement from constructing a lasting peace and friendship. These inequities 
thus enhanced the likelihood that both parties would question their relationship 
rather than the terms of the settlement. Where a party concludes that the rela-
tionship itself is at issue, the document is worthless. 
69 Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2005) at 67.
70 Ibid.
71 Delaware Nation v Pennsylvania, 2004 WL 2755545 (ED Pa 2004) at para 414.
72 Delaware Nation v Pennsylvania, 446 F3d 410 (3d Cir 2006).
73 Colin G Calloway, Pen and Ink Witchcraft: Treaties and Treaty Making in American Indian History 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 96 [Calloway, Pen and Ink Witchcraft].
74 Ibid at 97.
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First Peoples and colonial representatives or settler states entered into treaties 
with the hope of securing certainty. Where one party breached their obligations, 
the other was entitled to obtain redress. Yet whether an alleged breach was ad-
mitted or redress provided depended on how the dispute was determined and 
who was positioned to determine it. The ability to conclude whether the treaty 
had been breached and an obligation for redress was owed, therefore held con-
siderable power over the meaning of the terms of any settlement. In the early 
years of treaty making, colonial powers recognized First Peoples as partners, and 
disputes were determined on that basis. Consider again the Covenant Chain. As 
Morito explains, the Covenant Chain may not have been the ‘product of a golden 
age of Crown-Aboriginal relations,’ but it ‘was a distinctive type of intercultural 
arrangement.’75 Established ‘in the context of war, intrigue, hard-edged and of-
ten illicit trading practices, and an array of related conflicts,’76 both parties, at 
different times, accused the other of breaching their agreement. For instance, 
in the 1680s, Virginia Governor Baron Howard of Effingham claimed that the 
Five Nations broke the Covenant Chain when they killed two hundred cattle. 
He later asserted that they ‘deceived English folks by using white flags of truce 
to gain entrance to forts and, after being fed, raid[ed] the forts, killing its in-
habitants, and taking prisoners.’77 To avoid war, representatives of the Mohawk – 
the eastern-most of the Five Nations – intervened. Despite asserting their own 
innocence, the Mohawk ‘accepted blame on behalf of their brother nations’ for 
having breached their bond.78 They then engaged in acts to renew the Covenant 
Chain, which involved ‘an unusual amount of gift giving’ and admonishing the 
other nations.79 Morito notes that this example demonstrates that disputes were 
determined ‘like proceedings at a court of law between interlocutors willing and 
able to sue, negotiate, and construct narratives in an attempt to gain legal advan-
tage,’80 but it also reveals the essentially relational character of the agreement. 
The Covenant Chain was not perfect, but decisions were made ‘by consulta-
tion and treaty,’ and both parties committed to renewing relations more or less as 
equals.81 This did not last. In North America, as imperial Britain fragmented into 
settler states, those new states sought to domesticate the nation-to-nation agree-
ments that they had made with the First Peoples. While continuing to recognize 
treaties as legal instruments, domestication allowed the United States and Can-
ada to monopolize the role of arbiter of disputes. The unilateral reinterpretation 
75 Morito, Ethic of Mutual Respect, supra note 46 at 19. See further Walters, ‘Brightening the 
Covenant Chain,’ supra note 10.
76 Morito, Ethic of Mutual Respect, supra note 46 at 19.
77 Ibid at 22–3.
78 Ibid at 23.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Calloway, Pen and Ink Witchcraft, supra note 73 at 24; John Borrows, ‘Wampum at Niagara: 
The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History and Self-Government’ in Michael Asch, 
ed, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality and Respect for Difference 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 155 at 161 [Borrows, ‘Wampum at Niagara’].
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of treaties by colony-qua-state courts displaced the relational character of the 
agreements and marginalized First Peoples’ understanding of the terms that they 
had struck.
Consider the Sioux treaties as an example. The Sioux entered into treaties 
with the United States in 1851 and 1868.82 The 1868 Treaty acknowledged the 
Great Sioux Nation’s powers of self-government and criminal jurisdiction.83 It 
also included an article regulating land cession. Under Article XII, ‘at least three-
fourths of all of the adult male Indians occupying or interest[ed] in the’ land 
must provide their consent before territory could be ceded. While clear on its 
face, the provision would not be interpreted by US actors in a manner favourable 
to the Sioux. In 1877, following the Battle of Little Bighorn and the Great Sioux 
War, the United States forced the Sioux to sign a subsequent agreement.84 Al-
though the earlier treaties set out a legal requirement governing alienation, the 
1877 agreement purported to cede the Sioux Nation’s Black Hills to the United 
States with signatures from only 10 per cent of all adult male Indians. Despite 
protestations, the United States simply ignored the Sioux. It was not until 1980 
that the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the agreement was an 
illegal taking under the US Constitution.85 
A similar fate befell the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Nations. All entered 
into treaties with the United States in the late 1860s, which provided that land 
could only be transferred with three-quarters consent of the adult male popula-
tion. However, following congressional enactment of the Indian Appropriations 
Act 1871,86 and the Dawes Act 1877,87 the United States reduced the tribes’ res-
ervations without that consent. In Lone Wolf v Hitchcock, the US Supreme Court 
upheld those state actions, confirming that Congress had ‘[p]lenary authority’ 
over Indian affairs, including the power to unilaterally abrogate treaty obligations 
and appropriate land without Native American consent.88 The Court held fur-
ther that this power was political and not subject to judicial review.89 In reaching 
this conclusion, the United States transformed the character of the agreements 
that they had signed with these nations. No longer a priori legal instruments 
82 Stephen Young, ‘The Sioux’s Suits: Global law and the Dakota Access Pipeline’ (2017) 6:1 
Am Indian L Rev 173 at 182–4.
83 Treaty of Fort Laramie, 15 Stat 635 (1868), art 1.
84 Agreement of 1877, 19 Stat 254 (1877) at 256.
85 United States v Sioux Nation, 448 US 371 (1980). The US Supreme Court held that the Sioux 
were entitled to receive interest on compensation payments owed. The Sioux have not ac-
cepted the award as it would terminate their demand for the return of their land. Their 
award continues to accrue compound interest and now stands at over one billion US dollars. 
‘Why the Sioux Are Refusing $1.3 Billion,’ PBS News Hour (24 August 2011), online: <www.
pbs.org/newshour/arts/north_america-july-dec11-blackhills_08-23>.
86 25 USC § 71.
87 Ch 119, 24 Stat 388.
88 Lone Wolf, supra note 14 at 565, White J majority. See also Walter R Echo-Hawk, In the Courts of 
the Conqueror: The 10 Worst Indian Law Cases Ever Decided (Golden, CO: Fulcrum, 2010), ch 7.
89 Lone Wolf, supra note 14 at 565, White J majority.
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negotiated between equal political communities through which the United States 
secured the right to settle Native American land, treaties became domestic legal 
instruments entirely subject to the US Constitution.
The relational character of nation-to-nation agreements was also transformed 
in Canada. Following British victory in the French and Indian War, King George 
III issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763. It restricted colonial expansion and 
guaranteed Aboriginal ‘Nations or Tribes’ undisturbed possession of their ter-
ritories, unless purchased by the Crown or ceded via treaty by delineating 
‘boundaries and jurisdiction between Aboriginal people and the Crown.’90 As 
John Borrows and Leonard Rotman explain, the Royal Proclamation sought ‘to 
convince Indians that the British would respect existing political and territorial 
jurisdiction ... implying that no lands would be taken from Indians without their 
consent.’91 More than twenty-four First Nations assented to the Royal Proclama-
tion when it was presented to them as the Treaty of Niagara in 1764.92 Over the 
following 150 years, imperial Britain and later Canada would enter into treaties 
with various First Peoples to encourage peaceful relations and, later, to secure 
territory for colonial settlement.93 
The negotiation of the Peace and Friendship Treaties and the Numbered Trea-
ties may have suffered from inequities at times, but the larger problem was that 
Canada domesticated those agreements and assumed the power to unilaterally 
interpret their terms. A clash over a logging licence served as the trigger for this 
pivot in Canada. Several years after Confederation, a dispute arose over which 
level of government obtained the beneficial interest in land acquired by treaty. 
The federal government had issued a permit to a lumber company allowing it to 
harvest trees on territory ceded by the Ojibwe people and within the province 
of Ontario. The Ontario government challenged the permit. In St. Catherine’s 
Milling and Lumber Co v R.,94 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council found 
for Ontario. While the decision rested on the interpretation of the British North 
America Act 1867, the judges took the opportunity to remark on the nature of 
Aboriginal title.95 Abrogating the spirit of the Royal Proclamation, they held that 
‘the tenure of the Indians was a personal and usufructuary right, dependent 
90 Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763, reproduced in RSC 1985, Appendix II. See generally 
Borrows, ‘Wampum at Niagara,’ supra note 81. The Royal Proclamation also applied to the 
American colonies, but its effect ceased after the American Revolution when Great Britain 
ceded the land to the United States in the Treaty of Paris (1783).
91 Borrows & Rotman, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 59 at 20.
92 Borrows, ‘Wampum at Niagara,’ supra note 81.
93 Christina Godlewska & Jeremy Webber, ‘The Calder Decision, Aboriginal Title, Treaties, and 
the Nisga’a’ in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven & Jeremy Webber, eds, Let Right Be Done: Aborig-
inal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 1 
at 12–15; JR Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2009).
94 St Catherine’s Milling, supra note 13. See further Kent McNeil, Flawed Precedent: The St Cathe-
rine’s Case and Aboriginal Title (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019).
95 St Catherine’s Milling, supra note 13 at 57–8, Lord Watson majority; British North America Act 
1867 (UK), 30 Vict, c 3, ss 91(24), 92(5), 109.
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upon the good will of the sovereign.’96 No representatives of the Ojibwe people, 
or, indeed, any First Peoples, were heard.97 
A similar interpretive process occurred in Aotearoa / New Zealand. In 1848, 
the Ngāti Toa iwi (tribe) provided land to the Anglican Church on the promise 
that it would construct a school. The Ngāti Toa understood that they had made a 
‘tuku of land – akin to a conditional gift – to the Bishop’ in exchange for a church 
school that ‘required the maintenance of ongoing mutual and reciprocal rela-
tionships.’98 The church failed to build a school and later obtained a Crown grant 
to the land without the consent of Ngāti Toa. In Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, 
Chief Justice Michael Prendergast dismissed the iwi’s challenge to recover their 
land, holding that Native customary law must be supported by a Crown grant.99 
In reaching this decision, Prendergast CJ considered the legal force of the Te 
Tiriti o Waitangi. Drawing on the fact that there was not ‘a single Māori “nation,”’ 
Prendergast CJ asserted that ‘no body politic existed capable of making a cession 
of sovereignty’ so that ‘as the instrument purported to cede the sovereignty … it 
must be regarded as a simple nullity.’100 Considering the Māori signatories ‘prim-
itive barbarians,’101 Prendergast CJ unilaterally annulled the treaty. 
The Wi Parata decision highlights the length to which state actors went to 
avoid their legal obligations under treaty. Indeed, in 1901, Aotearoa / New Zea-
land’s highest court, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council overturned Wi 
Parata, pointing out that the state had statutory authority to recognize customary 
rights.102 In response, the parliament passed two acts to extinguish any Native ti-
tle rights in the land at issue in the case and imposed a statutory limitation to pre-
vent a claim.103 As David Williams notes, New Zealand’s judiciary ‘flatly rejected 
the admonition of the final appellate court for the empire and resolutely refused 
to distance themselves from Wi Parata,’ which would be New Zealand’s stance 
until it was conclusively overruled in 2003.104 Contemporary scholarship now 
96 St Catherine’s Milling, supra note 13 at 54.
97 It was not until 1973 that the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that Aboriginal title 
could exist in Canadian law. Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313 at 
328–9, Martland, Judson & Ritchie JJ majority; at 394, Hall, Spence & Laskin JJ dissenting.
98 David V Williams, ‘Maori Social Identification and Colonial Extinguishments of Customary 
Rights in New Zealand’ (2007) 13:6 Social Identities 735 at 741 [Williams, ‘Maori Social 
Identification’].
99 Wi Parata, supra note 12; Grant Morris, ‘James Prendergast and the Treaty of Waitangi: 
Judicial Attitudes to the Treaty during the Latter Half of the Nineteenth Century’ (2004) 
35:1 VUWLR 117.
100 Wi Parata, supra note 12 at 78. See also R v Symonds, [1847] NZPCC 387 at 390; Miller et al, 
Discovering Indigenous Lands, supra note 64 at 214–20. David Williams argues that the ‘simple 
nullity’ obiter dictum has overshadowed the more important aspects of the Wi Parata case. Da-
vid Williams, A Simple Nullity? The Wi Parata case in New Zealand Law and History (Auckland: 
Auckland University Press, 2011), ch 3.
101 Wi Parata, supra note 12 at 77.
102 Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, [1901] UKPC 18.
103 Williams, ‘Maori Social Identification, supra note 98 at 743.
104 Ibid at 746–8, discussing Wallis v Solicitor-General, (1903) NZPCC 23, the Native Land Act 1909 
and then referencing Attorney-General v Ngati Apa, [2003] 3 NZLR 643.
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recognizes that the Māori signatories to the Treaty of Waitangi did not cede sov-
ereignty105 and that the treaty’s principal drafters understood and accepted this 
position.106 Nonetheless, just like in the United States and Canada, state actors 
in Aotearoa / New Zealand monopolized the interpretative function, avoided 
their legal obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi and entirely abrogated their 
relational responsibilities. 
States domesticated treaties in different ways. In each case, however, the pivot 
from treaty partner to treaty adjudicator proved crucial in furthering domestica-
tion. As Dale Turner argues, ‘treaty rights were interpreted solely by reference to 
non-Indigenous legal norms and values,’ to the extent that treaties were ‘textu-
alized in the language of the dominant European culture.’107 These treaties may 
always have been inequitable, but, as the power of the settler states increased, 
‘respect for Indian custom and concerns diminished and long-standing practices 
and rituals of reciprocity eroded.’108 When states pivot, they prioritize their own 
interpretations of the treaty and fail to recognize or respect First Peoples’ un-
derstanding. When this occurs, the treaty may be law, but it will not lead to, nor 
produce, positive relationships.
IV Modern treaties and the law
Modern treaty practices offer immense potential. The promise of respectful 
negotiation culminating in meaningful settlements presents an opportunity to 
rectify ongoing injustice and create the possibility of right relations. For these 
promises to be realized, however, the challenges and limitations that marred his-
toric treaties must be avoided or resolved. First Peoples and some states have 
primarily responded to those challenges by attempting to establish fairer nego-
tiation processes. Process is important. As we articulated above, many historic 
treaties struck between First Peoples and colonial powers were one-sided and 
unjust because their negotiation was not fair. And, yet, structuring treaty pro-
cesses to minimize power imbalances within the negotiations will not resolve all 
challenges. Fairer processes of negotiations may enhance the likelihood of an 
equitable outcome, but it cannot guarantee fair settlement terms, let alone meet 
105 Waitangi Tribunal, He Whakaputanga, supra note 44.
106 Ned Fletcher, ‘A Praiseworthy Device for Amusing and Pacifying Savages? What the Framers 
Meant by the English Text of the Treaty of Waitangi’ (PhD Dissertation, University of Auck-
land, 2014); David Williams, ‘Originalism and the Constitutional Canon of Aotearoa New 
Zealand’ in Mark Hickford & Carwyn Jones, eds, Indigenous Peoples and the State: International 
Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018) 57 at 65; David Wil-
liams, ‘The Pre-history of the English Laws Act 1858: McLiver v Macky (1856)’ (2010) 41:3 
VUWLR 361.
107 Dale Turner, ‘From Valladolid to Ottawa: The Illusion of Listening to Aboriginal People’ in 
Jill Oakes et al, eds, Sacred Lands: Aboriginal World Views, Claims, and Conflicts (Edmonton: Ca-
nadian Circumpolar Institute, 1998) 53. Cited in Macklem, ‘Constitutional Identity,’ supra 
note 28 at 8.
108 Calloway, Pen and Ink Witchcraft, supra note 73 at 99.
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First Peoples’ expectations over sovereignty and self-government, for example.109 
Similarly, clear rules governing the process and conduct of negotiations will not 
prevent the state from pivoting from treaty partner to treaty adjudicator at some 
point in the future. Where this risk remains, First Peoples may question the qual-
ity of the treaty relationship.
A DEVELOPING FAIRER PROCESSES OF NEGOTIATION
Securing a fair process of negotiation is essential for modern treaty making. As a 
relational instrument, the moral and political authority of any treaty is directly re-
lated to the process of its development. Recognizing this, states and First Peoples 
have responded by structuring the negotiation process in a manner that aims to 
remedy the power imbalances that First Peoples would otherwise bear in treaty 
talks. In many cases, the process has been divided into two phases: (a) develop-
ing a negotiation framework and (b) negotiating under that framework. In this 
subpart, we explore these two phases. In the following subpart, we examine the 
limits inherent to the legal structures within which those negotiations take place. 
The first phase is concerned with developing a framework for negotiations. 
Setting up a standardized procedure under which treaty talks will be conducted 
serves several goals. First, it seeks to prevent ad hoc discussions and enables all 
parties to converse on the basis of clearly established rules and criteria.110 In this 
respect, it attempts to rectify some of the problems of historic treaties by stand-
ardizing conditions for negotiating terms and ensuring that representatives from 
both First Peoples and the state are empowered to negotiate on behalf of their 
representatives. At the same time, however, a negotiation framework also looks 
forward by responding to structural inequities experienced by First Peoples to-
day. While First Peoples have traditionally been alienated from, and unable to 
have their voices heard within, the processes of government, a negotiation frame-
work is developed in consultation with their representatives. As such, it offers 
First Peoples an opportunity to have their interests considered in the design and 
implementation of law that affects them.111 Finally, it also ensures that treaty talks 
do not commence until both sides are ready to start negotiations. Before com-
mencing, First Peoples, for example, need to develop a clear sense of what a treaty 
might mean for their communities as well a broad consensus on their negotiating 
position. Importantly, preparing for treaty negotiations can also enable First Peo-
ples to engage in nation (re)building, consistent with their values and aspirations, 
which is valuable regardless of the content, or even the completion, of a treaty.112 
109 Harry Hobbs, ‘Treaty Making and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Les-
sons from Emerging Negotiations in Australia’ (2019) 23:1–2 Intl JHR 174.
110 Christopher McKee, Treaty Talks in British Columbia, 3d ed (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) at 
112 [McKee, Treaty Talks].
111 Marcus Stewart, ‘A First People’s Assembly Could Deliver What Our People Have Been De-
manding for So Long,’ Guardian Australia (13 June 2019), online: <www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2019/jun/13/a-first-peoples-assembly-could-deliver-what-our-people-have-
been-demanding-for-so-long>.
112 Harry Hobbs, Alison Whittaker & Lindon Coombes, ‘As the Federal Government 
Debates an Indigenous Voice, State and Territories Are Pressing Ahead,’ The Conversation 
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The Victorian treaty process is currently in this first phase. Although the 
state government committed to entering treaty negotiations in 2016,113 Aborig-
inal Victorians explained that they were not ready to commence any process, 
given considerable uncertainty as to what any treaty might look like. As such, 
the government provided substantial funding to enable First Peoples in Victo-
ria to discuss and reach agreement on an appropriate state-wide representative 
body where a common position over these preliminary matters could emerge. 
Throughout late 2016 and early 2017, Aboriginal Victorians discussed the prin-
ciples that should underpin a representative body that would work with the 
state to develop a negotiation framework.114 These discussions were held in 
regional and urban centres across the state and were complemented by infor-
mal community-run conversations organized by self-nominated individuals115 
as well as an online ‘message stick’ that allowed those who could not attend to 
voice their opinions. Estimates suggest that around 7,500 Aboriginal Victorians 
were consulted or directly engaged with this process.116 Although only com-
prising around 15 per cent of the 2016 self-reported total of 47,788 Aborigi-
nal Victorians, this number was relatively considerable for public consultation 
processes.
However, because treaties are relational, their ultimate negotiation and suc-
cess will also rely on the support of non-Indigenous peoples.117 Conscious of this, 
the state government has sought to promote awareness of, and build support 
for, treaty among non-Indigenous Victorians during the first stage. Two elements 
are worth noting. First, the government established a Victorian Treaty Advance-
ment Commission (VTAC), whose primary role was to ‘maintain momentum of 
the treaty process.’118 Led by a Gunditjmara woman, Jill Gallagher,119 the VTAC 
led consultations with Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Victorians, undertook re-
search, provided advice on the process, and was required to keep all Victorians 
informed.120 The state government also initiated an innovative public education 
campaign involving digital, radio, print, and billboard advertising. Under the 
campaign, prominent Aboriginal Victorians invited non-Indigenous Australians 
(16 July 2019), online: <https://theconversation.com/as-the-federal-government-debates-
an-indigenous-voice-state-and-territories-are-pressing-ahead-120411>.
113 Aboriginal Victoria, Summary of the Aboriginal Victoria Forum, 26–27 May 2016, Melbourne 
(2016) at 1.
114 Aboriginal Treaty Working Group, Aboriginal Community Consultations on the Design of a Repre-
sentative Body (December 2016).
115 Aboriginal Treaty Working Group, Treaty Circle Facilitators Handbook (2017) at 27.
116 Aboriginal Treaty Working Group, Aboriginal Community Consultations on the Design of a Repre-
sentative Body — Phase 2 (June 2017) at 6.
117 Ravi de Costa, ‘Treaty How?’ (2003) 4:1 Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public 
Affairs 1.
118 Victorian Treaty Advancement Commission (VTAC), ‘About the Commission,’ online: 
<http://victreatyadvancement.org.au/about-commission>.
119 Luke Donnellan, ‘New Commissioner to Advance Journey to Treaty,’ Media release from 
the acting minister for Aboriginal affairs (13 December 2017).
120 The VTAC was abolished when the state-wide representative body was established.
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to ask them ‘deadly questions.’121 Despite some concern that racist opinions 
might be amplified, the questions were overwhelmingly respectful.122 Almost 
four thousand questions were asked, with queries spanning Aboriginal culture, 
history, and relations with non-Indigenous Victorians. What a treaty would mean 
for First Peoples was a recurring question.123 Independent research has suggested 
that the campaign has been relatively successful, with 51 per cent of surveyed Vic-
torians agreeing or strongly agreeing that ‘the “State Government should formal-
ize new relationships with Aboriginal Victorians,” an increase of seven percent 
from before the campaign.’124
These initial steps were formalized in June 2018, when the Victorian Parlia-
ment passed Australia’s first treaty bill. The Advancing the Treaty Process with 
Aboriginal Victorians Act 2018 (Victoria) creates a legislative basis for negotiat-
ing a treaty with Aboriginal people in the state. Under the Act, the government 
is obligated to recognize an Aboriginal-designed representative body that will 
administer a self-determination fund to support Aboriginal Victorians in treaty 
negotiations.125 Established as a not-for-profit organization, the First Peoples’ As-
sembly of Victoria will retain structural independence from government. It will 
not negotiate on behalf of Aboriginal Victorians but, rather, will work with the 
state to develop a treaty negotiation framework. Reflecting the crucial relational 
character of treaty, this framework must accord with several guiding principles 
set out in the Act: self-determination and empowerment; fairness and equality; 
partnership and good faith; mutual benefit and sustainability; and transparency 
and accountability.126 Elections for the First Peoples’ Assembly were held in late 
2019. In December 2019, the Assembly held its inaugural meeting in the Victo-
rian Parliament’s Upper House chamber.127 The next step involves developing 
the negotiation framework. 
British Columbia adopted a similar approach.128 Following the provincial gov-
ernment’s announcement that it intended to negotiate treaties, a First Peoples 
121 Victoria, ‘Deadly Questions,’ supra note 35; Samantha Hutchinson, ‘Victoria Launches 
Campaign in Support of Indigenous Treaty,’ The Australian (2 June 2018), online: <www.
theaustralian.com.au/nation/victoria-launches-campaign-in-support-of-indigenous-treaty/
news-story/8b9bdc2714621b3244271906376d6dd7>.
122 Natalie Hutchins, ‘Deadly Questions Shifts Focus to Treaty,’ Media Release from the Minis-
ter for Aboriginal Affairs (21 September 2018).
123 Victoria, ‘Deadly Questions,’ supra note 35.
124 Aboriginal Victoria, Advancing the Treaty Process: Annual Report and Plan 2018–19 (2019) at 18.
125 Advancing the Treaty Process with Aboriginal Victorians Act 2018 (Vic), ss 8–10.
126 Ibid, ss 21–5.
127 As Gallagher explained, the location was chosen because ‘Parliament House is the cen-
tre of power in this state. It is fitting that our assembly shares the same stage.’ Madeline 
Hayman-Reber, ‘“Victoria’s First Peoples” Assembly to Meet at “Colonial Power Struc-
ture,”’ NITV (1 November 2019), online: <www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/2019/11/01/
victorias-first-peoples-assembly-meet-colonial-power-structure>.
128 For a discussion on what the entire comprehensive land claims process looks like, see Chris-
topher Alcantara, ‘To Treaty or Not to Treaty? Aboriginal Peoples and Comprehensive Land 
Claims Negotiations in Canada’ (2007) 38:2 Publius 343 at 345–6 [Alcantara, ‘To Treaty or 
Not to Treaty’].
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representative organization proposed the ‘creation of a tripartite task force to 
recommend appropriate procedures and principles on which to base the negotia-
tions.’129 This position was accepted. In 1990, the British Columbia Treaty Claims 
Task Force was established largely to support First Peoples, whom did not want 
‘to be caught without a thoughtful, strategic position or to be put into a position 
where they could be outflanked by more skilled government negotiators.’130 The 
taskforce comprised seven commissioners, two appointed by the federal and pro-
vincial Canadian governments, and three by First Peoples. Although this extra 
appointee was intended to ‘counteract a potential power imbalance between Ab-
original and non-Aboriginal representatives,’ as well as more accurately represent 
interests of First Peoples located across British Columbia,131 non-Aboriginal gov-
ernments retained a majority position on the taskforce. Nonetheless, following 
six months of consultations, the taskforce recommended that the parties commit 
to ‘a new relationship based on mutual trust, respect, and understanding’ by es-
tablishing a treaty commission to facilitate political negotiations.132 In 1993, the 
British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) was inaugurated.133 
Establishing a negotiation framework is critical. However, legacies of disposses-
sion and extermination mean that many First Peoples may nonetheless be both 
distrustful of, and ill-prepared to, enter negotiations with the state. The second 
phase is designed to remedy resource and material disparities by ensuring that 
First Peoples are capable of ascertaining their aspirations and carrying them out 
through the arduous negotiation stage. Among other elements, it involves the 
provision of focused legal, financial, and other support for individual First Peo-
ples. Since no formal treaty negotiation process in Australia has yet reached the 
second stage – the Noongar Treaty was achieved outside an explicit treaty process – 
it is useful to explore the approach pursued in Canada. 
In Canada, federal and provincial governments provide funding to First Peo-
ples to prepare themselves for negotiations. In British Columbia, funding is al-
located by the BCTC,134 while, in other treaty processes, the funding is provided 
directly via the central government following an application process. Funding 
is critical to balance inequities at the negotiation stage so that First Peoples can 
participate. However, several problems have emerged. For instance, in its second 
annual report, the BCTC noted:
In no case could the Commission provide the level of funding requested by any First Na-
tion. The amount of funds provided over the long term does not appear to be sufficient to 
129 McKee, Treaty Talks, supra note 110 at 32.
130 Ibid.
131 Andrew Woolford, Between Justice and Certainty: Treaty Making in British Columbia (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2005) at 194, n 2.
132 British Columbia Claims Taskforce, ‘The Report of the British Columbia Claims Task Force,’ 
Report (Vancouver: British Columbia Claims Taskforce, 28 June 1991) at 42, Appendix 6, 
recommendations 1, 3.
133 British Columbia Treaty Commission Agreement, 15 May 1992; Treaty Commission Act, RSBC 1996, 
c 461; British Columbia Treaty Commission Act, SC 1995, c 45.
134 Treaty Commission Act, supra note 133, s 5(3)(b); British Columbia Treaty Commission Act, supra 
note 133, s 5(3)(b).
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accomplish the goals expressed by the Task Force. Even with savings through such steps as 
information sharing, the gap between First Nations needs and available funds will widen 
because the financial needs of First Nations are expected to increase as they progress 
through the process.135 
Total funding has increased. In its 2018 annual report, the BCTC identified that 
since 1993 730 million Canadian dollars in negotiation support funding had 
been allocated,136 though it is not clear whether this quantum has been sufficient 
for First Peoples to manage the process. 
In any case, even with increased funding levels, the larger problem is that 
the majority of funding initially came in the form of a loan. Only 20 per cent of 
funding allocated to First Peoples consisted of a non-repayable contribution,137 
with the remaining 80 per cent treated as an ‘advance on the cash transfer com-
ponent’ of a treaty.138 Of the 730 million Canadian dollars that has been allocated 
via the BCTC, for example, some 567 million Canadian dollars was to be re-
paid.139 Unsurprisingly, this meant that the anticipated capital transfer for many 
First Peoples would be ‘substantially offset by their loan debt.’140 This is especially 
true for numerically smaller nations as well as those engaged in negotiations for 
substantial periods of time. 
Inquiries into the modern treaty processes in Canada have indicated that the 
debt burden is an ‘unsustainable barrier to progress.’141 Indeed, reports suggest 
that some communities find themselves in a type of limbo: they have decided to 
no longer actively engage in negotiations, but they have chosen not to formally 
withdraw ‘because of concerns that Canada will seek repayment of their loans.’142 
Accordingly, the special rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples argues 
that the processes ‘have contributed to a deterioration rather than renew of the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and the Canadian State.’143 Recognizing 
the practical and symbolic challenges inherent to this policy, the federal govern-
ment has reassessed its approach in recent years. In the 2018 budget, the federal 
government announced that it would no longer fund First Peoples participation 
135 British Columbia Treaty Commission, Second Annual Report 1994–1995 (1995) at 15.
136 British Columbia Treaty Commission, Annual Report 2018 (2018) at 57 [BC Treaty Commis-
sion, Annual Report].
137 Ibid.
138 Douglas Eyford, Ministerial Special Representative on Renewing the Comprehensive Land 
Claims Policy, A New Direction: Advancing Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (2015) at 61 [Eyford, A 
New Direction].
139 BC Treaty Commission, Annual Report, supra note 136 at 57.
140 Eyford, A New Direction, supra note 138 at 61.
141 James Lornie, Final Report with Recommendations Regarding the Possibility of Accelerating Negotia-
tions with Common Table First Nations That Are in the BC Treaty Process, and Any Steps Required (30 
November 2011) at 29.
142 Eyford, A New Direction, supra note 138 at 61.
143 James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigneous Peoples: The Situation of 
Indigenous Peoples in Canada, UN Doc A/HRC/27/52Add2 (4 July 2014) at 16, para 61. See 
also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No 105/09 Petition 592/07 Admis-
sibility Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group Canada (30 October 2009) at para 37.
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in treaty negotiations via loans; instead, the government would directly support 
groups in these negotiations through non-repayable contributions.144 In 2019, 
this commitment was extended, with the government committing to forgive all 
outstanding loans and reimburse First Peoples who had already repaid their loan, 
at a total cost of 1.4 billion Canadian dollars.145 This is a significant step that rec-
ognizes the relational character of modern treaties. An enduring relationship is 
not built on a policy that requires First Peoples to borrow money in order to ‘get 
their land back.’146 
The manner in which states approach treaty talks can also heighten or di-
minish power imbalances. This is true of all negotiations between the state and 
First Peoples. In Australia, for example, negotiations often take place between 
governments and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities over the rec-
ognition of Native title. While the majority of native title determinations are ulti-
mately reached through agreement,147 this does not mean that talks are free from 
confrontation. Governments of all persuasions frequently adopt a single-minded 
and defensive focus on technical issues such as whether Native title has been ex-
tinguished or whether the community can demonstrate an ongoing connection 
to the country rather than a holistic approach to tackling land needs, disadvan-
tage, and development. Indeed, as Jon Altman and Francis Markham have noted, 
state and Commonwealth governments continue to oppose Native title claims, 
‘contesting them at every point.’148 
In the attempt to overcome similar shortcomings in treaty talks in Canada, 
Michael Coyle argues that negotiators should adopt an ‘interest-based’ or ‘in-
tegrative’ negotiation strategy rather than a ‘positional’ one. As Coyle explains, 
positional bargaining is structured on an assumption ‘that successful claiming by 
one party will inevitably leave less value available to the other,’ leading negotia-
tors to adopt rigid strategies and an adversarial approach.149 In contrast, an inte-
grative approach begins from ‘a joint review of each party’s goals, priorities and 
preferences’ and ‘explores, without commitment, a wide range of settlement op-
tions that might advance these goals.’150 Compared to positional bargaining, inte-
grative strategies are more likely to take into account the interests of both parties 
and address substantive issues in a collaborative way, enhancing the likelihood 
144 Canada, Budget 2018 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2018) at 140.
145 Canada, Budget 2019 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2019) at 129.
146 Eyford, A New Direction, supra note 138 at 62.
147 Hobbs, ‘Locating the Logic,’ supra note 53 at 533.
148 Jon Altman & Francis Markham, ‘Burgeoning Indigenous Land Ownership: Diverse Values 
and Strategic Potentialities’ in Sean Brennan et al (eds), Native Title from Mabo to Akiba: A 
Vehicle for Change and Empowerment? (Annandale, Austl: Federation Press, 2015) 126 at 141. 
See also Toni Bauman & Lydia Glick, eds, The Limits of Change: Mabo and Native Title 20 Years 
On (Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 2012)
149 Michael Coyle, ‘Negotiating Indigenous Peoples’ Exit from Colonialism: The Case for an In-
tegrative Approach’ (2014) 27:1 Can JL & Jur 283 at 287–8 [Coyle, ‘Negotiating Indigenous 
Peoples’].
150 Ibid at 288.
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that an agreement will endure ‘particularly in contexts of deep conflict.’151 In-
tegrative bargaining appears to offer clear advantages, including the capacity to 
broaden the attitudes and perspectives of treaty negotiators. As we explore below, 
however, the legal structures in which those negotiations take place will continue 
to prove problematic. 
B LEGAL LIMITATIONS
It is vital that power imbalances are minimized in any fair negotiation. However, 
because ‘no negotiation framework can alter the external power relations be-
tween parties,’ not all imbalances can be resolved by remedying resource dispar-
ities or adopting a more collaborative negotiation posture.152 As we saw in Part 
III, modern treaties have been domesticated; negotiations take place within the 
law of the state. This structural limitation has been criticized by many First Peo-
ples and non-Indigenous scholars. Taiaiake Alfred, for instance, has argued that, 
by framing negotiations within the context of Canadian law, the adopted trea-
ties lack an international element and deny Indigenous nationhood.153 Similarly, 
James Tully contends that Canadian governments consider themselves ‘entering 
into negotiations with “minorities” within Canada,’ presupposing a ‘relationship 
of subordination and some form of subjection to the Crown’ and consequently 
‘foreclos[ing] precisely what the negotiations should be about.’154 More recently, 
Robert Hamilton and Joshua Nichols have noted that the modern treaty process 
‘has been hamstrung by … an insistence on the part of the Crown of fitting Ab-
original peoples into a judicially mediated rights framework that fails to evenly 
allocate bargaining power to the parties.’155 
Legal limitations damage the capacity for treaties to reset relationships. For 
First Peoples who choose to walk away from negotiations, the concern is that 
structural inequities within the negotiation framework may infect the quality of 
the relationship that the document purports to create. Even when negotiation 
protocols are developed in consultation with First Peoples, they too readily re-
flect non-Indigenous understandings of land and governance and exclude from 
negotiation many areas of jurisdiction that First Peoples would like to discuss in 
treaty negotiations. Indeed, because these inequities include even the ‘forms of 
knowledge, proof, and discourse’ through which the parties converse,156 the nor-
mative ordering of the state risks ‘becoming the presumed baseline from which 
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid at 300.
153 Taiaiake Alfred, ‘Deconstructing the British Columbia Treaty Process’ (2001) 3 Balayi: Cul-
ture, Law and Colonialism 37 at 39–43.
154 James Tully, ‘Reconsidering the BC Treaty Process’ in British Columbia Treaty Commission, 
Speaking Truth to Power: A Treaty Forum (Vancouver: British Columbia Treaty Commission, 
2001) 3 at 8.
155 Robert Hamilton & Joshua Nichols, ‘The Tin Ear of the Court: Ktunaxa Nation and the 
Foundation of the Duty to Consult’ (2019) 56:3 Alta L Rev 729 at 733, n 13 [Hamilton & 
Nichols, ‘Tin Ear of the Court’].
156 Alcantara, ‘To Treaty or Not to Treaty,’ supra note 128 at 353.
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new ideas are developed and adjudged.’157 As we saw in Part III, treaty relation-
ships built on marginalizing or ignoring First Peoples’ worldviews will fail to last. 
In this Part, we identify a related, but distinct, point: states must enact legisla-
tion to give the treaties legal effect, but, as domestic settlements, modern treaties 
cannot prevent the state from pivoting from treaty partner to treaty adjudicator. 
Where this occurs, the value of the agreement is lost as the treaty becomes an 
‘instrument[] of assimilation or amalgamation’ rather than of ‘connection and 
association.’158 
Consider the situation in Canada. Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 
recognizes and affirms the ‘existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aborig-
inal peoples of Canada.’ Appropriately, this provision requires Canadian state 
actors to consider First Peoples’ treaty rights when contemplating action that 
may affect or interfere with those rights. However, while treaty rights are con-
stitutionally protected, courts have held that they can be infringed by ordinary 
legislation. Under the three-part Badger/Sparrow test,159 if First Peoples establish 
that a treaty right has been limited, the onus falls on the government to justify 
the infringement. If the government can demonstrate a compelling and substan-
tial legislative objective,160 and that its actions are nonetheless consistent with 
upholding the honour of the Crown,161 the Court will find that infringement 
constitutionally valid. While the Court has rejected the notion that the ‘public in-
terest’ could serve as a valid legislative objective,162 it has nonetheless confirmed 
that the conservation of natural resources,163 and even the ‘pursuit of economic 
and regional fairness,’164 could justify infringement. As Kent McNeil notes, this 
broad formulation may allow constitutional rights to be ‘overridden on broad 
policy grounds.’165 Of course, over time, negotiated agreements may need to be 
updated, and the terms struck may need to be amended. It should be uncon-
troversial to argue that this should occur between the parties to the agreement 
rather than through the unilateral determination of state courts. 
In grappling with these complex issues, Canadian courts have developed a 
public fiduciary-like obligation characterized as the honour of the Crown. De-
rived from the Crown’s ‘assumption of sovereignty over lands and waters’ 
157 Coyle, ‘Establishing Indigenous Governance,’ supra note 8 at 149; Michael Coyle, ‘Tran-
scending Colonialism? Power and the Resolution of Indigenous Treaty Claims in Canada 
and New Zealand’ (2011) 24 NZULR 596.
158 Jones, ‘Māori and State Visions,’ supra note 20 at 15; Graben & Meaffey, ‘Negotiating 
Self-Government,’ supra note 63 at 167.
159 Badger, supra note 42 at para 73, Cory J; R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1113 [Sparrow].
160 Sparrow, supra note 159 at 1113.
161 Ibid at 1118.
162 Ibid at 1113.
163 Ibid.
164 R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at para 75, Lamer CJ majority.
165 Kent McNeil, ‘How Can Infringements of the Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples 
Be Justified?’ (1997) 8:2 Const Forum Const 33 at 39. See also R v Marshall (No 2), [1999] 
3 SCR 533 at para 6. See also John Borrows, ‘Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Del-
gamuukw v British Columbia’ (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 537; John Borrows, ‘The Durability 
of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia’ (2014) 48 UBC L Rev 701 at 740.
MODERN TREATY MAKING AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW
This advance online version may differ slightly from the final published version.































































formerly held by sovereign First Peoples,166 the principle requires that the Crown 
act honourably ‘in all its dealing with Aboriginal peoples.’167 It gives rise to several 
obligations, including a duty to consult with and accommodate the interests of 
First Peoples when contemplating conduct that might adversely affect potential 
or established Aboriginal or treaty rights.168 The duty ostensibly reflects a com-
mitment to acknowledge historical injustices and a desire to right relations by 
promoting collaboration and partnership.169 Nonetheless, while the application 
of a fiduciary-like relationship can produce positive results in individual cases, it 
remains conflicted. Conceptually, fiduciary-like principles are generally applica-
ble in cases of vulnerability and are incongruous to the notion of equal partner-
ship.170 Further, in practice, the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence has 
not moved away from conceiving the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate 
Aboriginal rights as part of a broader project of ensuring that its ability to ‘extin-
guish’ those rights is consistent with the Constitution.171 As much as the Canadian 
Constitution recognizes and affirms the rights of First Peoples, state law positions 
First Peoples as subjects rather than as equal partners. Whatever relationality may 
arise through the negotiation of a treaty, the state’s ability to adjudicate disputes 
weakens that character. 
These same challenges are identifiable in other supposedly positive approaches 
to treaty interpretation. For instance, courts in the United States and Canada, 
and the Waitangi Tribunal in Aotearoa / New Zealand, have developed princi-
ples of treaty construction that advantage First Peoples, including by resolving 
ambiguities or unclear expressions in their favour as well as narrowly construing 
terms that seek to restrict their rights.172 These canons are positive, particularly 
when considering historic practices, but concerns remain.173 For one, interpre-
tive presumptions construed against the state do not necessarily benefit First Peo-
ples as claimants, for disputes are still determined by state courts who may fail to 
appreciate Indigenous concerns or limit Indigenous rights when attempting to 
166 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 53.
167 Ibid at para 17.
168 Ibid at paras 16–25; Mikisew Cree v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69, 
[2005] 3 SCR 388. See generally Dwight Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult: New Relation-
ships with Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2014).
169 Brian Slattery, ‘Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown’ (2005) 29 SCLR 433 at 436.
170 For an analysis of New Zealand’s fiduciary duty, as imported from Canada’s jurisprudence, 
see Nicole Roughan, ‘Public/Private Distortions and State-Indigenous Fiduciary Relation-
ships’ (2019) 42:1 NZLR 9.
171 See e.g. Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010; Haida Nation, supra note 2; 
Tshilqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation]; 
Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017 SCC 
54, [2017] 2 SCR 386; Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 2017 SCC 40, [2017] 1 
SCR 1069; Chippewas of the Thames v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2017 SCC 41, [2017] 1 SCR 1099.
172 Montana v Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 US 759 at 766–8 (1985); Badger, supra note 42 at para 
41; Waitangi Tribunal, Motunui Waitara Report, supra note 9 at 49.
173 See e.g. Borrows, ‘Origin Stories,’ supra note 17 at 41–2. Note also that this interpretative 
presumption does not apply to modern treaties because it is assumed that First Nations 
signatories are sophisticated partners.
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incorporate them into existing frameworks.174 Similarly, it is not clear that the 
judiciary is the proper forum to be examining these issues. The judiciary is un-
able to account for the historical and ongoing roles that courts and legislatures 
played in assuming for themselves the authority to unilaterally interpret those 
agreements on behalf of the other party and their interests. Nation-to-nation 
relationships have already been transformed into state-to-subject relationships. 
Interpretative presumptions cannot rectify this history. 
Aotearoa / New Zealand has also struggled to respond to the limits of the 
law in giving effect to the Treaty of Waitangi. From the 1950s through to the 
1970s, many Māori and their supporters called on the government to ‘Honour 
the Treaty.’ This public campaign eventually led to the formation of a tribunal to 
investigate breaches of the treaty.175 The Waitangi Tribunal is composed of both 
Māori and Pākehā members. It is charged with inquiring into, and making rec-
ommendations in relation to, claims from Māori that they have been prejudicially 
affected by legislation or Crown action that is inconsistent with principles of the 
treaty. Initially, the tribunal was empowered to investigate alleged breaches by 
the government or any state-controlled body occurring after 1975. The tribunal 
could make recommendations about how to redress those breaches, but it did 
not have legal authority to enforce remedies.176 In 1985, the Act was amended to 
provide the tribunal with retrospective jurisdiction dating from 1840,177 though 
its enforcement powers were not strengthened. Instead, after the tribunal has 
made findings on a complaint, the Crown and the iwi were to engage in settle-
ment processes to address and rectify breaches of the treaty. 
Significantly, and much like modern treaty making, these settlements pro-
vide important economic benefits for relevant iwi and hapū as they attempt 
to cultivate the relational character of the treaty.178 In recognizing that state 
law could both inhibit the development of innovative and productive settle-
ments as well as challenge their resolution, a ‘deliberate strategy to return 
Treaty issues to the political arena, rather than relying on the Tribunal or a 
court of law’ was adopted.179 Much like the Covenant Chain, which hinged on 
acknowledging wrongdoing and providing recompense, these modern settle-
ments foreground apologies in both English and Te Reo Māori.180 Consider, 
174 See e.g. Hamilton & Nichols, ‘Tin Ear of the Court,’ supra note 155.
175 Nicola R Wheen & Janine Hayward, ‘The Meaning of Treaty Settlements and the Evolu-
tion of the Treaty Settlement Process’ in Nicola R Wheen & Janine Hayward, eds, Treaty of 
Waitangi Settlements (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2012) 1 at 17 [Wheen & Hayward, 
‘Meaning of Treaty Settlements’; Wheen & Hayward, Treaty of Waitangi Settlements]; McDow-
ell, ‘Diverting the Sword of Damocles,’ supra note 67.
176 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (NZ), s 5(1)(a).
177 Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985 (NZ), s 3, amending Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (NZ), 
s 6(1).
178 Ruru, ‘Treaty in Another Context,’ supra note 5 at 312–13.
179 Mason Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self-Determination (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press 1998) at 188.
180 See Maureen Hickey, ‘Apologies in Settlements’ in Wheen & Hayward, Treaty of Waitangi 
Settlements, supra note 175, 80.
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for instance, a small part of the apology recorded in the Ngāi Tahu Claims 
Settlement Act 1998 (New Zealand):
The Crown recognises the protracted labours of the Ngāi Tahu ancestors in pursuit of 
their claims for redress and compensation against the Crown for nearly 150 years. … The 
Crown hereby acknowledges the work of the Ngāi Tahu ancestors and makes this apology 
to them and to their descendants.
The Crown acknowledges that it acted unconscionably and in repeated breach of the prin-
ciples of the Treaty of Waitangi in its dealings with Ngāi Tahu in the purchases of Ngāi 
Tahu land. The Crown further acknowledges that in relation to the deeds of purchase it 
has failed in most material respects to honour its obligations to Ngāi Tahu as its Treaty 
partner, while it also failed to set aside adequate lands for Ngāi Tahu’s use, and to provide 
adequate economic and social resources for Ngāi Tahu.181 
Apologies can be effective in recognizing past wrongs in important and meaning-
ful ways,182 but similar structural challenges that affect the process in Canada are 
present in Aotearoa / New Zealand. 
First, Waitangi Tribunal reports are not binding. Their effectiveness relies on 
the state determining to engage. Although the government has sometimes ac-
cepted Māori claims and enacted appropriate laws, reports indicate that tribu-
nal recommendations ‘are frequently ignored.’183 In 2018, for instance, Te Puni 
Kōkiri, the Ministry for Māori Development, revealed that only twenty-one out of 
130 reports had been ‘settled.’184 The full picture is a little more complex, but it 
does not resolve the larger problem. For many claims, the tribunal generally rec-
ommends that the state enter into negotiations toward a treaty settlement. The 
aim of these agreements is to settle alleged breaches of the treaty in a manner 
consistent with the spirit of the tribunal’s recommendations. The report from 
the Waitangi Tribunal’s inquiry will usually play an important role in negotiations 
between the group and the state, but ‘the purpose of a settlement is to reflect the 
interests of the parties concerned, and who freely enter into those settlements’ 
and not necessarily to directly implement the tribunal’s recommendations.185 
Second, the state has rejected offering full compensation for the extinguish-
ment of Māori rights because to do so would ‘place too great a burden on the 
present and future generations of taxpayers.’186 Instead, the Crown views redress 
181 Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 (NZ), s 6.
182 A Dirk Moses, ‘Official Apologies, Reconciliation, and Settler Colonialism: Australian Indig-
enous Alterity and Political Agency’ (2011) 15:2 Citizenship Studies 145; Ruru, ‘Treaty in 
Another Context,’ supra note 5 at 315–16.
183 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observa-
tions on the Fourth Periodic Report of New Zealand, UN Doc E/C.12/NZL/CO/4 (1 May 2018) 
at 2, para 8.
184 Te Puni Kōkiri, The Section 8I Report: A Report on Progress Made in Implementation of Recommen-
dations Made to the Crown by the Waitangi Tribunal (2018) at 79–84.
185 Ibid at 5.
186 Office of Treaty Settlements, Ka Tika a Muri, Ka Tika a Mua; Healing the Past, Building a Fu-
ture: A Guide to Treaty of Waitangi Claims and Negotiations with the Crown (Wellington: Office of 
Treaty Settlements, 2018) at 83. Other issues are also affected by Crown policy. For example, 
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as a means of ‘recognizing the claimant group’s historical grievances … restoring 
the relationship between the claimant and the Crown, and … contributing to a 
claimant group’s economic development.’187 While providing full compensation 
may inhibit the government from meeting other policy objectives and a focus 
on restoring relations is an admirable goal that seeks to develop and encourage 
the relational aspects of the treaty, it is difficult to see how unilaterally preclud-
ing potential settlement outcomes from the negotiation will help achieve better 
partnerships or treaty promises. Essentially, indicative of inequities in bargaining 
power,188 Māori must choose whether to accept less for the sake of economic 
benefits and promises of a better relationship in the future. This has been further 
complicated by the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 2006, which required 
Māori to submit their historical claims to the tribunal before 1 September 2008 
(later extended to 2014), with the aim of resolving all claims by 2020.189
Third, where iwi or hapū decide to engage in these processes, there is no guar-
antee that the settlement will proceed smoothly or as they intend when given 
effect through legislative enactment. Indeed, the entire settlement process can 
be ‘fraught with conflict and dispute,’ as the settlements can become ‘subject to a 
range of different types of legal challenges from various parties who believe they 
are prejudiced by the negotiation process or its outcomes.’190 Further, while set-
tlement negotiations take place in the political arena, the settlements themselves 
only become effective through domestic legislation;191 each requires an Act of the 
New Zealand Parliament. Although political convention dictates that agreements 
are not substantively amended in Parliament, legislation ‘cannot bind future par-
liaments from revisiting Māori claims,’192 and the adjudication of any dispute 
arising from the settlement may be taken to the Waitangi Tribunal or state courts 
to be addressed.
Recognizing this problem points to a fundamental challenge facing all First 
Peoples contemplating modern treaty making. Under state law, the Treaty of 
Waitangi has no specific legal effect unless it is incorporated into legislation.193 
While this precludes iwi, hapū, and whānau (extended family) from relying on 
generally speaking, the Crown has ‘ruled out the transfer of conservation estate land to 
Māori as part of a Treaty settlement.’ Katherine Sanders, ‘“Beyond Human Ownership”? 
Property, Power and Legal Personality for Nature in Aotearoa New Zealand’ (2018) 30 J En-
vtl L 207, 214
187 Wheen & Hayward, ‘Meaning of Treaty Settlements,’ supra note 175 at 15.
188 Annie Mikaere, ‘Settlement of Treaty Claims: Full and Final, or Fatally Flawed?’ (1997) 17:2 
NZLR 451.
189 Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 2006 (NZ), s 6AA.
190 Baden Vertongen, ‘Legal Challenges to the Treaty Settlement Process’ in Wheen & Hay-
ward, Treaty of Waitangi Settlements, supra note 175, 65; Ngati Apa Ki Te Waipounamu Trust v R, 
[2000] NZCA 45.
191 See e.g. Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 (NZ), s 9(c); Philip A Joseph, Con-
stitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, 4th ed (Wellington: Brookers, 2014) at 853.
192 McDowell, ‘Diverting the Sword of Damocles,’ supra note 67 at 607.
193 Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board, [1941] AC 308 (PC); Ngati Apa Ki 
Te Waipounamu Trust v Attorney-General, [2003] 1 NZLR 779 (HC).
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their interpretations of the Te Reo Māori version of the Treaty of Waitangi to vin-
dicate their legal rights,194 its considerable ‘moral and normative power can con-
tinue untouched, as a reference point for political agitation.’195 Conversely, when 
the treaty is incorporated as law, it can protect Māori interests by constraining 
discretionary government decision making, but its legal effect will be ‘prescribed 
by the particular legislative words used.’196 In other words, once it is ‘inside the 
law, it becomes an instrument of the legal system and a plaything for lawyers and 
judges.’197 Of course, this does not mean that the treaty should not be codified 
in state law if that is what Māori people desire, but in concretizing their rights, 
iwi and hapū risk empowering the state with the capacity to pivot from its role as 
partner to adjudicator.198
All First Peoples engaged in modern treaty processes must determine whether 
to take that same risk. Consider again the Noongar Treaty. Negotiated between 
the Noongar people and the Western Australian government, the settlement was 
approved by the Noongar people before being enacted in state legislation.199 
Inside that law, the treaty protects Noongar interests and requires the state to 
meet its commitments. At the same time, whether one party has failed to uphold 
its legal obligations will be determined solely by Australian courts. Additionally, 
as treaty rights are not constitutionally protected in Australia, the Western Aus-
tralian and federal Parliament could enact legislation to unilaterally abrogate its 
terms. 
V An ethic of treaty making?
For modern treaties to secure the parties aspirations for certainty, their agree-
ment must have legal force. The domestication of nation-to-nation agreements 
means that legal force is obtained via the enactment of state legislation. As we 
have argued, however, the challenge is that legislating a treaty enables the state 
to pivot from its role as partner to adjudicator, displacing its relational character 
and potentially ultimately its legal strength. While modern treaty practices have 
sought to soften inequities at the negotiation stage, they have proven unable to 
194 Ruru argues that ‘New Zealand Parliament has been at the forefront of … incorporating 
‘the principles of the Treaty’ in specific statues. For the most part, however, Maori are more 
enamoured with the actual text, specifically the Maori language text.’ Ruru, ‘Treaty in An-
other Context,’ supra note 5 at 32.
195 Palmer, ‘Constitutional Realism,’ supra note 55 at 31.
196 Edward Willis, ‘The Treaty of Waitangi: Narrative, Tension, Constitutional Reform’ (2019) 2 
NZLR 185 at 186.
197 Palmer, ‘Constitutional Realism,’ supra note 55 at 31.
198 Note, however, that because the Treaty of Waitangi has been domesticated, the state de facto 
takes on the role of treaty adjudicator in their actions whether treaty principles have been 
incorporated in legislation or not. We thank the anonymous reviewer for this point.
199 Noongar (Koorah, Nitja, Boordahwan) (Past, Present, Future) Recognition Act 2016 (WA); Land 
Administration (South West Native Title Settlement) Act 2016 (WA). As the process was conducted 
under the framework of Commonwealth legislation, however, the treaty ultimately derives 
its force from registration under a Commonwealth Act. Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).
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avoid or rectify this larger challenge. In this Part, we argue that efforts to build 
positive and productive relationships both inside and outside treaty processes 
are vital to cultivating a culture that takes First Peoples’ rights seriously. Acts of 
relationality may ameliorate the harsher effects of state law on modern treaties by 
constructing an ethic of treaty making. While an ethic of treaty making may not 
legally preclude states from acting in ways that it supposes are in its own interests, 
nor prevent a state court from adjudicating a dispute in accordance with state 
law, acts of relationality may help recentre focus on the broader promise of treaty. 
Acts of relationality should be broadly conceived as measures that encourage 
or facilitate conversation and engagement between First Peoples and non-Indig-
enous peoples and communities. As some First Peoples have acknowledged, this 
requires that they ‘engage the state’s legal and political discourses.’200 However, 
if sites of encounter are to transform colonial structures and ways of thinking, it 
is primarily incumbent on non-Indigenous peoples to be engaged in breaking 
down settler frameworks, including a unilateral approach to interpreting and 
enforcing state law. One way of doing so is to learn from First Peoples about their 
cultures, laws, and forms of life or ways of being.201 Doing so can help reveal the 
ways in which settler frameworks continue to be impediments to positive relation-
ships and, importantly, that unilaterally relying on state law to resolve inter-com-
munal disputes can be risky and potentially harmful. 
Acts of relationality might begin with rituals and practices that acknowledge 
First Peoples’ presence. For instance, it has become common practice in Aus-
tralia for official functions to begin with a welcome to country or an acknowl-
edgement of country. A welcome to country is performed by an Indigenous elder 
of the particular territory where the function is being held. Typically, the elder 
welcomes visitors by offering safe passage and protection while in the country. 
The welcome may also be accompanied by a smoking ceremony to cleanse the 
site and ward off bad spirits. An acknowledgement of country is given by a non-In-
digenous person or an Indigenous person who is not connected to that country. 
It involves a short statement that focuses the audience’s attention on the fact 
that the land where they are meeting is an ancestral country for a particular 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander nation. Consider the statement read by the 
speaker of the Australian Parliament each morning (since 2010): ‘I acknowledge 
the Ngunnawal and Ngambri peoples who are the traditional custodians of the 
Canberra area and pay respect to the elders, past and present, of all Australia’s 
Indigenous peoples.’202 An acknowledgement of country is a small gesture, but 
200 Dale Turner, This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy (Toronto: Univer-
sity of Toronto Press, 2006) at 5.
201 We agree with scholars who argue that Indigenous legal traditions should play a role in 
modern treaty practices, and non-Indigenous peoples need to learn and apprehend what 
that means. See Sarah Morales, ‘(Re)defining “Good Faith” through Snuw’uyulh’ in John 
Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of His-
toric Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017) 277.
202 DR Elder & PE Fowler, eds, House of Representatives Practice, 7th ed (Canberra: Department of 
the House of Representatives, 2018) at 253.
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it is also ‘an opportunity for anyone to show respect for Traditional Owners and 
the continuing connection of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.’203 
Despite anxieties that these rituals are ‘tokenistic’204 or ‘patronising,’205 research 
suggests that a majority of Indigenous Australians perceive these protocols ‘as a 
valuable, albeit belated recognition of Indigenous culture and history.’206 As New 
South Wales Aboriginal Land Council Chairwoman Bev Manton has argued,
[i]t’s simply wrong to suggest that recognising the Aboriginal custodians of land in this 
country is tokenistic or impractical. … By showing a modicum of respect for traditional 
owners and their ancestors’ passed, you are doing a great deal to help bridge the gulf 
between black and white in this country. Using these words at official events may not heal 
the sick, or boost educational outcomes for Aboriginal kids, but it’s not supposed to. It 
does however show that our elected leaders have an understanding and an admiration for 
Aboriginal culture and people. It’s symbolism, but it’s essential symbolism.207
In tracing the development of these public rituals, Mark McKenna locates their 
emergence in the early 1990s. While they may echo the highly structured meeting 
protocols adopted and adapted by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
over generations, the contemporary manifestation was explicitly intended to ‘cre-
ate a national identity or ethos.’208 Even if there is a risk that not all invocations will 
be meaningful or sincere,209 their existence forces non-Indigenous Australians to 
pause, if only for a moment, and consider how colonization has shaped the lives 
of Indigenous Australians. Although relatively minor, ritual acts of relationality 
like these affect social and institutional attitudes and aid in the development of an 
ethic necessary to protect and promote treaty relations. Former chief justice of the 
High Court of Australia, Robert French agrees, noting that it would ‘be a bold con-
clusion that the Welcomes to Country and Acknowledgements of Country which 
are repeated day-in-day-out in countless events, public and private, across Australia 
have no impact upon societal and institutional cultures and awareness.’210
203 Reconciliation Australia, ‘Welcome to Country: Acknowledgement of Country’ (14 Decem-
ber 2017) online: <www.reconciliation.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/welcome_ 
acknowledgement_v4.pdf>.
204 See discussion in Emma Kowal, ‘Welcome to Country: Acknowledgment, Belonging and 
White Anti-Racism’ (2015) 21:2 Cultural Studies Review 173.
205 Kristina Everett, ‘Welcome to Country … Not’ (2009) 79 Oceania 53 at 58.
206 Mark McKenna, ‘Tokenism or Belated Recognition? Welcome to Country and the Emer-
gence of Indigenous Protocol in Australia, 1991–2014’ (2014) 38:4 Journal of Australian 
Studies 476 at 478 [McKenna, ‘Tokenism’]; Francesca Merlan, ‘Recent Rituals of Indige-
nous Recognition in Australia: Welcome to Country’ (2014) 116:2 American Anthropologist 
297 at 297.
207 Cited in McKenna, ‘Tokenism,’ supra note 206 at 487.
208 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, ‘National Strategy to Sustain the Reconciliation Pro-
cess’ (1998), cited in McKenna, ‘Tokenism,’ supra note 206 at 482.
209 John Stone, ‘Aboriginal Policy: 50 Years of Failure,’ Quadrant, vol 61 (11 November 2017) 
at 11, online: <https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2017/11/fifty-years-unremitting-failure- 
aboriginal-policy-since-1967-referendum/>.
210 Robert French, ‘Book Forum: The Hon Robert French AC,’ AusPubLaw (14 August 2019), 
online: <https://auspublaw.org/2019/08/book-forum-the-hon-robert-french-ac/>.
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A welcome to country may include a portion of an Aboriginal language, but, 
in Australia, it is likely that any speech will be conducted in English. Language 
itself is another critical element that speaks to the tenor of the relationship be-
tween Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities. As the Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues has recently noted, ‘[l]inguistic diversity contributes to the 
promotion of cultural identity … and to intercultural dialogue.’211 Promoting 
and using Indigenous languages can contribute to ‘reconciliation and peace-
building,’ transmit knowledge to future generations, reduce inequalities, and 
mitigate discrimination.212 Revitalizing First Peoples languages and both pro-
moting their public use and encouraging non-Indigenous peoples to study or 
engage could thus help cultivate acts of relationality between First Peoples and 
non-Indigenous peoples. While there is increasing engagement with, and inter-
est in, First Peoples languages in Australia213 and North America,214 the Māori 
in Aotearoa / New Zealand have pioneered the revitalization of Te Reo Māori 
(Māori language). Since the 1970s and 1980s, Te Reo Māori has been viewed 
as an important but, at times, contentious medium for bridging and building 
relations. In the 1970s, Māori began speaking their language in their capacity as 
government employees, causing some controversy. New Zealand’s Ministry for 
Culture and Heritage explains: 
In 1984 national telephone tolls operator Naida Glavish (of Ngāti Whātua) began greet-
ing callers with ‘Kia ora.’ When her supervisor insisted that she use only formal Eng-
lish greetings, Glavish refused and was demoted. The issue sparked widespread public 
debate. Not everyone was keen to hear ‘kia ora’ used commonly … [others] called the 
tolls exchange to speak to ‘the kia ora lady’. … After Prime Minister Robert Muldoon 
intervened, Glavish returned to her old job. Eventually, she was promoted to the inter-
national tolls exchange, where she greeted New Zealand and overseas callers alike with 
‘Kia ora.’215
The second article of the Treaty of Waitangi guarantees all Māori ‘chieftain-
ship over their lands, villages and all their treasures,’ with the Te Reo Māori word 
for treasures (taonga) understood to mean not only more than merely physical 
possessions (as in the English text) but also other elements of cultural heritage. 
211 Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Action Plan for Organizing the 2019 International Year 
of Indigenous Languages, 17th Sess, UN Doc E/C19/2018/8 (21 February 2018) at para 3 
[Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Action Plan].
212 Ibid at para 31.
213 See e.g. Aboriginal Languages Act 2017 (NSW), which promises to reconnect Aboriginal peo-
ples in New South Wales with their culture and heritage ‘by the reawakening, growing and 
nurturing of Aboriginal languages.’ However, despite enactment in 2017, it has not yet en-
tered into force.
214 See e.g. Serafín M Coronel-Molina & Teresa L McCarty, eds, Indigenous Language Revitaliza-
tion in the Americas (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016).
215 Ministry for Culture and Heritage, ‘History of the Māori Language,’ New Zealand History (10 Octo-
ber 2017), online: <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/maori-language-week/history-of-the- 
maori-language>.
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In 1985, Māori claimants to the Waitangi Tribunal asserted that Te Reo Māori was 
taonga, a position subsequently confirmed by the tribunal.216 
Alongside the Waitangi Tribunal process, Māori communities proactively 
sought to ‘regain or hold on to Maori language and culture’ through other 
means.217 As Linda Tuhiwai Smith explains, ‘[w]hile the claims to the Tribunal 
were being made on the basis of tribal interests, and even these were contested 
within tribes,’ a language revival movement ‘was built on the more fundamental 
unit of whanau or extended family.’218 Te Kōhanga Reo is a Te Reo Māori educa-
tional program designed for preschool children, which strives to transmit and re-
vive Māori language and culture.219 In its first year, 1982, the organization sought 
limited funding from the Department of Māori Affairs to start the program, with 
the ultimate goal of becoming self-sufficient.220 Political success through the 
Waitangi Tribunal, led to legal change; in 1987, Te Reo Māori was adopted as an 
official state language,221 increasing state support. By 1994, there were eight hun-
dred kōhanga reo (language nests), with many institutions also identifying adult 
learner needs.222 
State support has led to some complications. In 2011, claimants brought a case 
before the Waitangi Tribunal, alleging that the Crown ‘had effectively assimilated 
the kōhanga reo movement into its early childhood education regime … stifling 
its vital role in saving and promoting the Māori language, which led to a decline 
in the number of Māori children participating.’223 The tribunal largely accepted 
this allegation when it released its report in 2013. The report found that due 
to management and resourcing issues the Crown’s early childhood education 
system had failed to support the needs of the Te Kōhanga Reo, and, in doing so, 
216 Waitangi Tribunal, Report of The Waitangi Tribunal on the Te Reo Maori Claim (Wai 11, 1986) at 
43.
217 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (Dunedin, 
New Zealand: University of Otago Press, 2008) at 169.
218 Ibid.
219 Augie Fleras, ‘Te Kohanga Reo: A Maori Renewal Program in New Zealand’ (1989) 16 Cana-
dian Journal of Native Education 78; Rachael Ka’ai-Mahuta, ‘The Impact of Colonisation on 
te reo Māori: A Critical Review of the State Education System’ (2011) 4 Te Kaharoa 195 at 
216–18; Tania Rei & Cara Hamon, ‘Te Kōhanga Reo 1982’ in Anne Else, ed, Women Together: 
A History of Women’s Organisation in New Zealand Nga Ropu Wahine o te Motu (Wellington: 
Daphne Brasell Associates Press and New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, 1993) 40 
[Rei & Hamon, ‘Te Kōhanga Reo 1982’].
220 Rei & Hamon, ‘Te Kōhanga Reo 1982,’ supra note 219 at 40–2.
221 Maori Language Act 1987 (NZ), s 3.
222 EY, Te Kōhanga Reo National Trust Board: Independent Review of Financial Controls for Public Fund-
ing Received (12 March 2014) at 4 [EY, Te Kōhanga Reo]; Kuni Jenkins & Tania Ka’ai, ‘Maori 
Education: A Cultural Experience and Dilemma for the State – a New Direction for Maori 
Society’ in Eve Coxon et al, eds, The Politics of Learning and Teaching in Aotearoa: New Zealand 
(Palmerston North, New Zealand: Dunmore Press, 1994) 148 at 168 (reporting a figure of 
609 in June 1990).
223 Kelvin Davis, ‘Kōhanga Reo Post-Budget Announcement Speech,’ Speech (4 June 2019), 
online: New Zealand Government <www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/k%C5%8Dhanga-reo- 
post-budget-announcement-speech>.
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had breached its duty under the treaty.224 Nonetheless, although Te Kōhanga 
Reo continues to face funding issues, it continues to transmit knowledge to a new 
generation. In 2014, around 460 Te Kōhanga Reo were operating, responsible 
for educating nearly nine thousand children across the country.225 It has ‘led to 
flourishing networks of Māori centred educational institutions[,] it has been in-
strumental in increasing Māori participation in early childhood … and has seen 
Māori emerge with the highest rates of participation in tertiary education of any 
group aged at twenty-five years and over.’226 More broadly, and due to the suc-
cess of programs like this, Te Reo Māori is visible throughout Aotearoa / New 
Zealand. 
Of course, there are challenges and significant room for improvement.227 
While Te Kōhanga Reo has helped revitalize Te Reo Māori for some, scholars 
have argued that a ‘strong monolingual (English only) attitude [persists] in the 
general population.’228 Māori remain the vast majority of Te Reo Māori speakers, 
and those who can ‘hold a conversation in te reo dropped from 4.5 percent [of 
the entire New Zealand population] in 2001 to 3.7 in 2013.’229 It has become ap-
parent that ‘Pākehā need to embrace te reo me ngā tikanga Māori’ too.230 Doing 
so would not just reveal unique ontologies and ways of seeing the world,231 but 
would also encourage non-Indigenous New Zealanders to understand and con-
front the ongoing effects of colonization. Building relationality aims to transform 
how state actors view their interests and, hence, what state law can do to facilitate 
shared governance. For this reason, it may help inform the approach of treaty 
negotiators. A move toward integrative bargaining, as suggested by Coyle,232 or 
224 Waitangi Tribunal, Matua Rautia: The Report on the Kōhanga Reo Claim (Wai 2336, 2013) at 
185.
225 EY, Te Kōhanga Reo, supra note 222 at 4.
226 Mason Durie, ‘Māori Achievement: Anticipating the Learning Environment’ (Paper pre-
sented at the fourth Hui Taumata Mātauranga, 5 September 2004, Taupo, New Zealand) at 
9, online: Massey University <www.massey.ac.nz/massey/fms/Te%20Mata%20O%20Te%20
Tau/Publications%20-%20Mason/Maori%20Achievement%20Anticipating%20the%20
learnong%20environment.pdf>.
227 Laura French Bourgeois, Roxane de La Balonnière & Donald M Taylor, ‘Revitalizing In-
digenous Languages: A Call for Community Action to Address Systemic Discrimination’ in 
Peter Trifonas & Themistoklis Aravossitas, eds, Handbook of Research and Practice in Heritage 
Language Education (Cham: Springer, 2017) 771 at 781–2; Tamati Reedy, ‘Te Reo Māori: The 
Past 20 Years and Looking Forward’ (2000) 39:1 Oceanic Linguistics 157 at 166–7.
228 Martin East, ‘Promoting Positive Attitudes toward Foreign Language Learning: A New Zea-
land Initiative’ (2009) 30:6 Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 493 at 
494.
229 Statistics New Zealand, ‘Māori Language Speakers,’ online: <http://archive.stats.govt.nz/
browse_for_stats/snapshots-of-nz/nz-social-indicators/Home/Culture%20and%20iden-
tity/maori-lang-speakers.aspx>.
230 Andrew Robb, ‘What Is the Role of Pākehā in Supporting Te Reo Māori?,’ E-Tangata (15 
July 2017), online: <https://e-tangata.co.nz/reo/what-is-the-role-of-pakeha-in-supporting- 
te-reo-maori/>.
231 Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Action Plan, supra note 211 at para 6.
232 Coyle, ‘Negotiating Indigenous Peoples,’ supra note 149.
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even a shift in government policy not to aggressively contest First Peoples claims, 
could open up possibilities. While it would not directly change the legal frame-
work in which negotiations are held, it could foster innovative and collaborative 
settlements and help promote good relations. 
In developing an ethic of treaty making, acts of relationality could also af-
fect how the state approaches the implementation of modern treaties. Research 
into the lived experiences of the Huu-ay-aht First Nations following the execu-
tion of the Maa-nulth First Nations Final Agreement confirms that, at present, 
‘colonial dynamics persist not only during [negotiation], but also through im-
plementation.’233 Divergent approaches to the treaty has meant that the parties 
understood their relational obligations in very different ways, with potentially 
significant consequences: 
After nearly two decades of active engagement and relationship-building at the negotia-
tion table, the federal and provincial negotiating personnel were replaced with implemen-
tation personnel. Little protocol was outlined for this transition, leaving Huu-ay-aht feeling 
‘divorced’ from a relationship that was purportedly based on mutual respect, not at all 
what was much-anticipated in the new ‘nation-to-nation’ relationship.234
The turnover of government personnel unaware of key details and problems ob-
taining relevant information led Huu-ay-aht First Nations to emphasize to the 
state the importance of relationships. Huu-ay-aht First Nations explained to gov-
ernment representatives responsible for implementation that, for the treaty to 
meet their aspirations, the state must ‘develop a relational understanding of the 
territories (including lands, waters, and sockeye) as well as the basic geography 
of’ treaty lands and signatories.235 For Huu-ay-aht First Nation, the state’s failure 
to meet its relational obligations put the treaty’s promises at risk. Notwithstand-
ing these challenges, Huu-ay-aht First Nations continues to view the treaty ‘as a 
tool for advancing the Nation’s self-determination.’236 
Of course, there are many other examples of relational acts than those we 
have described here.237 The key factor is that it involves non-Indigenous peoples 
engaging with, and learning from, First Peoples about their cultures, laws, and 
forms of life. In doing so, non-Indigenous peoples may come to appreciate how 
233 Huu-ay-aht First Nations et al, ‘Implementing a Modern Treaty in British Columbia: Lived 
Experiences from Huu-ay-aht First Nations – Maa-nulth Treaty Signatories’ (2019) 6:2 
Northern Public Affairs 41 at 41–2.
234 Ibid at 43.
235 Ibid at 44.
236 Ibid.
237 See e.g. John Borrows, ‘Creating an Indigenous Legal Community’ (2005) 50 McGill LJ 153; 
Amanda Woodrow, ‘University of Victoria Offers First Combined Indigenous Law Degree,’ 
Canadian Lawyer (7 March 2018), online: <www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/general/
university-of-victoria-offers-first-combined-indigenous-law-degree/274981>; Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary 
of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015) at 319–37. It is 
worth noting that Borrows has argued that ‘[r]econciliation has problematically dominated 
the jurisprudence dealing with Indigenous issues and is a flawed metaphor in this field.’ 
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settler frameworks continue to be impediments to shared governance and right 
relations. One of those impediments is an uncritical or unreflective use of state 
law to resolve disputes. As such, acts of relationality that break down settler frame-
works and that aim to transform colonial structures can be useful in reframing 
modern treaty making.
VI Conclusion 
Treaties between First Peoples and settler states have a dual character. On the 
one hand, treaties are legal instruments, which formally commit the parties to a 
series of mutual obligations. At the same time, however, treaties are more than 
simple legal agreements; they are testaments to a certain type of relationship 
governed by mutual respect and partnership. This is the promise of treaty. This 
promise can fail to materialize. Our review of the negotiation and interpretation 
of historic treaties revealed a challenge for modern treaty making. Treaties are 
only effective when they are able to realize both legal and relational goals. As the 
balance of political and military might swung toward the colonial powers, these 
nation-to-nation agreements were domesticated within state law and grounded in 
‘a monistic account of constitutional order.’238 This process allowed the state to 
pivot from treaty partner to treaty adjudicator, breaking the relational dimension 
of treaty. 
Modern treaty practices in Canada and Australia have attempted to avoid the 
challenges arising from their historical antecedents. These practices demonstrate 
respect for the equal status of First Peoples by seeking to develop fairer pro-
cesses of negotiation. However, as these agreements are domestic instruments, 
they obtain their legal force through the enactment of state legislation. Con-
sequently, even assuming that fair and equitable negotiation processes can be 
designed, state law does not and cannot prevent states from making that same 
pivot from treaty partner to treaty adjudicator. Can this challenge be resolved? 
We have argued that engaging in treaty negotiations without building relational 
characteristics inside and outside treaty processes will likely reproduce the prob-
lems associated with historical treaties. If modern treaty making is to lead to right 
relations and shared governance in a way that does not simply fit First Peoples 
into pre-existing state frameworks, it is important for non-Indigenous peoples to 
engage in acts of relationality. 
By their nature, acts of relationality are ephemeral, provisional, and partial. 
They are efforts to engage, to stop, to listen, to understand. While they are not a 
panacea and will not inevitably lead to right relations in an era of drastic power 
John Borrows, ‘Canada’s Colonial Constitution’ in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The 
Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historic Treaties (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2017) 17 at 20–1. This is why we argue that state law is problematic and lim-
ited – it can always dominate relational aspects or programs designed to be relational, as it 
has with the reconciliation discourse in Canada.
238 Macklem, ‘Indigenous Peoples,’ supra note 37 at 21.
MODERN TREATY MAKING AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW
This advance online version may differ slightly from the final published version.































































asymmetries, acts of relationality may assist in building a particular ethic of treaty 
making and treaty interpretation. As Carwyn Jones has argued, such an ethic may 
lead state actors to consider modern (and historic) treaties in the constitutional 
traditions of the First Peoples signatories.239 This approach does not require ne-
gating the legal character of treaties, but it encourages state actors to understand 
treaties in a comprehensive and holistic fashion that does justice to both parties’ 
intentions and aspirations. Acts of relationality may therefore help non-Indige-
nous citizens understand treaties as bridges between two worldviews rather than 
as contractual agreements that integrate First Peoples within state frameworks. 
239 See Carwyn Jones, New Treaty, New Tradition: Reconciling New Zealand and Maori Law (Van-
couver: UBC Press, 2016); Jones, ‘Māori and State Visions,’ supra note 20; Mark Walters, 
‘Rights and Remedies with Common Law and Indigenous Legal Traditions: Can the Cove-
nant Chain Be Judicially Enforced Today?’ in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right 
Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historic Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2017) 187.
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